Against Cyberanarchy by Goldsmith, Jack L.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound




Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jack L. Goldsmith, "Against Cyberanarchy," 65 University of Chicago Law Review 1199 (1998).
Against Cyberanarchy
Jack L. Goldsmitht
The Supreme Court's partial invalidation of the Communica-
tions Decency Act on First Amendment grounds' raises the more
fundamental question of whether the state can regulate cyber-
space at all.2 Several commentators, whom I shall call "regulation
skeptics," have argued that it cannot.3 Some courts have also ex-
pressed skepticism.4 The popular and technical press are full of
similar claims.'
t Associate Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. For their comments and dis-
cussion, I thank Bill Arms, Caroline Arms, Curtis Bradley, Stephen Choi, Richard
Craswell, David Currie, Larry Downes, Richard Epstein, Michael Froomkin, Elizabeth
Garrett, Andrew Guzman, Larry Kramer, Larry Lessig, Doug Lichtman, Richard Posner,
David Post, Cass Sunstein, Tim Wu, and participants at workshops at the University of
Chicago and the University of California (Boalt Hall). I also thank Kyle Gehrmann and
Greg Jacob for excellent research, and the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund for
support.
' See Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 133,
codified at 47 USCA §§ 223, 230, 303, 560-61, 609 (1991 & Supp 1998); Reno v ACLU, 117
S Ct 2329, 2346 (1997) (holding that CDA's prohibition on Internet transmission of inde-
cent or offensive messages to minors violates the First Amendment).
2 I shall use the terms "state,' "nation," and "jurisdiction' interchangeably to refer to
national, as opposed to subnational, legal authority. I shall indicate when the analysis dif-
fers for subnational units. Although the term "cyberspace' has a broader meaning, I shall
use it here loosely as a synonym for the Internet-the transnational network of computer
networks.
See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired
Censors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177, 178 (1997) ("For a long time, the Internees enthusiasts have
believed that it would be largely immune from state regulation."). The leading regulation
skeptics, and this Article's primary targets, are David Post and David Johnson. See David
R. Johnson and David Post, Law And Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan L
Rev 1367, 1367 (1996). See also David Post and David R. Johnson, Borders, Spillovers,
and Complexity: Rule-making Processes in Cyberspace (and Elsewhere), draft presented at
the Olin Law & Economics Symposium on "International Economic Regulation' at George-
town University Law Center (Apr 5, 1997) (copy on file with U Chi L Rev); David Post and
David R. Johnson, The New 'Civic Virtue' of the Internet (also published in The Emerging
Internet, Feb 1998, the Annual Review of the Institute for Information Studies), available
online at <www.cli.org.paper4.htm> (visited Sept 28, 1998); David G. Post, Governing Cy-
berspace, 43 Wayne L Rev 155 (1996); David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An
Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J Online L, Article 3, available online at
<www.wm.edu/law/publicationsjol/post.html> (visited Sept 10, 1998). Commentators who
have made similar arguments include John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of
Internet Regulation, 38 Harv Intl L J 207 (1997); John Parry Barlow, A Cyberspace Inde-
pendence Declaration, available online at <www.eff.org/barlow> (visited Sept 10, 1998);
Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn L Rev 1095 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg,
Governing Networks and Rule-making in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L J 911 (1996).
See, for example, ACLU v Reno, 929 F Supp 824, 832 (E D Pa 1995), affd, 117 S Ct
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The regulation skeptics make both descriptive and normative
claims. On the descriptive side, they claim that the application of
geographically based conceptions of legal regulation and choice of
law to a-geographical cyberspace activity either makes no sense
or leads to hopeless confusion. On the normative side, they argue
that because cyberspace transactions occur "simultaneously and
equally" in all national jurisdictions, regulation of the flow of this
information by any particular national jurisdiction illegitimately
produces significant negative spillover effects in other jurisdic-
tions. They also claim that the architecture of cyberspace pre-
cludes notice of governing law that is crucial to the law's legiti-
macy. In contrast, they argue, cyberspace participants are much
better positioned than national regulators to design comprehen-
sive legal rules that would both internalize the costs of cyber-
space activity and gi;e proper notice to cyberspace participants.
The regulation skeptics conclude from these arguments that na-
tional regulators should "defer to the self-regulatory efforts of
Cyberspace participants.'
This Article challenges the skeptics' arguments and their
conclusion. The skeptics make three basic errors. First, they
overstate the differences between cyberspace transactions and
other transnational transactions. Both involve people in real
space in one territorial jurisdiction transacting with people in
real space in another territorial jurisdiction in a way that some-
times causes real-world harms. In both contexts, the state in
which the harms are suffered has a legitimate interest in regu-
lating the activity that produces the harms. Second, the skeptics
do not attend to the distinction between default laws and manda-
tory laws. Their ultimate normative claim that cyberspace should
be self-regulated makes sense with respect to default laws that,
by definition, private parties can modify to fit their needs. It
makes much less sense with respect to mandatory or regulatory
laws that, for paternalistic reasons or in order to protect third
parties, place limits on private legal ordering. Third, the skeptics
underestimate the potential of traditional legal tools and technol-
ogy to resolve the multijurisdictional regulatory problems impli-
2329, 2348 (1997); Digital Equipment Corp v Altavista Technology, Inc, 960 F Supp 456,
462 (D Mass 1997); American Libraries Associations v Pataki, 969 F Supp 160, 170 (S D
NY 1997).
' See, for example, Thomas E. Weber, The Internet (A Special Report): Debate: Does
Anything Go? Limiting free speech on the Net, Wall Street J (Dec 8, 1997); Vinton G. Cerf,
Building an Internet Free of Barriers, NY Times § 3 p 12 (July 27, 1997); George Black,
Call for Controls: The Internet Must Regulate Itself, Fin Times part 4 p 12 (Apr 1, 1998).
' Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1367 (cited in note 3).
1200 [65:1199
HeinOnline  -- 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1200 1998
Against Cyberanarchy
cated by cyberspace. Cyberspace transactions do not inherently
warrant any more deference by national regulators, and are not
significantly less resistant to the tools of conflict of laws, than
other transnational transactions.
Some caveats are in order up front. This Article argues only
that regulation of cyberspace is feasible and legitimate from the
perspective of jurisdiction and choice of law. It does not argue
that cyberspace regulation is a good idea, and it does not take a
position on the merits of particular regulations beyond their ju-
risdictional legitimacy. For example, it does not examine whether
particular national regulations of the Internet promote democ-
racy, or are efficient, or are good or bad for humanity. Similarly,
the Article does not consider substantive limitations on cyber-
space regulation such as may be found in the Bill of Rights or in-
ternational human rights law. Resolution of these substantive
regulatory issues turns in part on contested normative judgments
and difficult context-specific, cost-benefit analyses that are far
beyond this Article's scope. But resolution of these issues also
turns on how we understand the jurisdictional confusions that
arise when national regulation, which has traditionally been un-
derstood primarily in geographical terms, applies to a phenome-
non that appears to resist geographical orientation. This jurisdic-
tional puzzle is the focus of this Article.
In addition, the Article does not deny that the new communi-
cation technologies known as cyberspace will lead to changes in
governmental regulation. Such changes are to be expected when
the speed of communication dramatically increases and the cost
of communication dramatically decreases. The invention of the
telegraph, the telephone, the radio, the television, and the satel-
lite, among many other communications advances, all possessed
these characteristics. And they all gave rise to societal and regu-
latory changes.7 So too will cyberspace. But the skeptics claim
much more than that cyberspace necessitates changes in govern-
mental regulation. They claim that cyberspace is so different
from other communication media that it will, or should, resist all
governmental regulation. My aim here is to show why this claim
is flawed, and to explain in general terms how traditional tools of
jurisdiction and choice of law apply to cyberspace transactions.
Section I of the Article summarizes the regulation skeptics'
claims. Section II provides a richer account than the skeptics of
See generally Irwin Lebow, Information Highways and Byways: From the Telegraph
to the 21st Century (IEEE 1995); Dan Lacy, From Grunts to Gigabytes: Communications
and Society (Illinois 1996).
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the realities of real-space multijurisdictional conflicts, and of the
tools available to manage such conflicts. Section III analyzes the
skeptics' descriptive claim that national regulation of cyberspace
is infeasible. Section IV analyzes their normative claim that such
regulation is illegitimate. Section V sketches a model for
grounding cyberspace transactions in real-space law.
I. THE REGULATION SKEPTICS' CLAIMS
People transacting in cyberspace do things that would be
regulated by state, national, or international law if they occurred
in person or by telephone or mail. They defame, invade privacy,
harass, and commit business torts.8 They make and breach con-
tracts.9 They distribute pornography and swap bombmaking
tips."° They infringe trademarks, violate copyrights, and steal
data." They issue fraudulent securities and restrict competition. 2
And so on.
Are these and other cyberspace activities governed by the
same laws that govern similar transnational activities mediated
in person, or by phone, or by mail? If so, which jurisdiction's law
governs? If not, what governs instead?
The regulation skeptics' analysis of these questions makes
two sets of assumptions. The first concerns the nature of legal
regulation of non-cyberspace events. 3 The skeptics tend to con-
ceptualize a nation's legal authority as extending to its territorial
borders and not beyond. This conception makes them skeptical
about the legitimacy of one nation regulating activities that take
place in another. And it leads them to believe that transnational
' See, for example, Naxos Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd v Southam, Inc, 1996 US Dist LEXIS
21757, *13-15 (C D Cal) (defamation); Panavision International, LP v Toeppen, 938 F Supp
616, 619 (C D Cal 1996) (interference with economic advantage); Sally Greenberg, Threats,
Harassment, and Hate Online: Recent Developments, 6 BU Pub Intl L J 673, 673-75, 680-
84 (1997) (harassment and threats).
' See, for example, Thompson v Handa-Lopez, Inc, 998 F Supp 738 (W D Tex 1998)
(contract made online).
" See, for example, United States v Thomas, 74 F3d 701, 704-05 (6th Cir), cert denied,
117 S Ct 74 (1996) (pornography); <www.personal.psu.edu/users/j/mtjmfll/aterror.txt>
(visited Sept 10, 1998) (bombmaking tips).
" See, for example, Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Coin, Inc, 952 F Supp 1119,
1121 (W D Pa 1997) (trademark infringement); Religious Technology Center v FA.C.T.-
NET, Inc, 901 F Supp 1519, 1521-22 (D Colo 1995) (copyright infringement); Anatomy of a
Cyber Break-in, Newsweek 63 (Feb 27, 1995) (data theft).
2 See, for example, Maritz, Inc v CyberGold, Inc, 947 F Supp 1328, 1329 (E D Mo
1996) (unfair competition); Robert A. Robertson, Personal Investing in Cyberspace and the
Federal Securities Laws, 23 See Reg L J 347, 397-405 (1996) (fraudulent securities).
13 The arguments from this paragraph are drawn from Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L
Rev at 1368-70 (cited in note 3); Post and Johnson, The New 'Civic Virtue' at 5-6 (cited in
note 3); Reidenberg, 45 Emory L J at 912-16 (cited in note 3).
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disputes must be resolved by choice-of-law rules that select a
unique governing law on the basis of where an event occurs or
where transacting parties are located. On this view, tort liability
is governed by the law of the place where the tort occurred and
the validity of a contract is governed by the law of the place
where the contract was made. Such choice-of-law rules are
thought to promote rule-of-law values like uniformity (that is,
every forum will apply the same law in a given case), predictabil-
ity, and certainty. And they are supposed to give the parties to
transnational transactions reasonable notice of governing law.
The skeptics' second set of assumptions concerns the archi-
tecture of cyberspace. They view cyberspace as a unique "bound-
ary-destroying" means of communication. Internet protocol ad-
dresses do not necessarily correlate with a physical location. As a
result, the skeptics assert, persons transacting in cyberspace of-
ten do not, and cannot, know each other's physical location. 4 In
addition, information mediated by certain cyberspace services
appears "simultaneously and equally in all jursidictions" around
the world. 5 A web page in Illinois can be accessed from and thus
appear in any geographical jurisdiction that is plugged in to the
World Wide Web. When I participate in an online discussion
group, my messages can appear simultaneously in every geo-
graphical jurisdiction where persons participate in the group. In
neither case can I control, or even know about, the geographical
flow of the information that I upload or transmit.
It is against this background that the skeptics make their
descriptive and normative claims. Descriptively, they claim that
cyberspace is a borderless medium that resists regulation con-
ceived in geographical terms. 6 One reason is that information
transmitted via cyberspace can easily flow across national bor-
ders without detection. 7 Another reason is that it is senseless to
apply geographically configured choice-of-law rules to a-
geographical cyberspace activities. 8 A third reason is that regula-
tion of the local effects of cyberspace information flows permits all
nations simultaneously to regulate all web-based transactions. 9
The result is multiple and inconsistent regulation of the same ac-
" See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1374-75 (cited in note 3); Burk, 28 Conn L
Rev at 1098, 1110-12 (cited in note 3).
"Post and Johnson, Borders, Spillovers, and Complexity at 5 (cited in note 3).
16 See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1370-72 (cited in note 3); Post and Johnson,
Borders, Spillovers, and Complexity at 6 (cited in note 3).
"See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1372-73 (cited in note 3).
"See id at 1374-76.
"See id at 1374.
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tivity. A final reason is that the architecture of cyberspace en-
ables its users to route around or otherwise evade territorial
regulation.
20
The skeptics' normative arguments build on these assump-
tions. Their essential normative claim is that it is illegitimate for
any particular nation to regulate the local effects of multijurisdic-
tional cyberspace activity. This is so for three reasons. First, such
regulation will often apply to acts abroad, and will thus be
impermissibly extraterritorial.2 1 Second, because cyberspace in-
formation flows appear in every jurisdiction simultaneously,
unilateral regulation of these flows will illegitimately affect the
regulatory efforts of other nations and the cyberspace activities of
parties in other jurisdictions.' Third is the problem of notice. The
skeptics argue that because a person transacting in cyberspace
does not know when or whether her activity produces effects in a
particular jurisdiction, she lacks notice about governing law and
therefore cannot conform her behavior to it.' They claim that un-
der these conditions, it is unfair to apply law to her cyberspace
activities. The skeptics believe that all three of these problems
can be avoided by cyberspace self-regulation.
To make these claims more concrete, consider the predica-
ment of one of the scores of companies that offer, sell, and deliver
products on the World Wide Web. Assume that the web page of a
fictional Seattle-based company, Digitalbook.com, offers digital
books for sale and delivery over the Web. One book it offers for
sale is Lady Chatterley's Lover. This offer extends to, and can be
accepted by, computer users in every country with access to the
Web. Assume that in Singapore the sale and distribution of por-
nography is criminal, and that Singapore deems Lady Chatter-
ley's Lover to be pornographic. Assume further that Digital-
book.com's terms of sale contain a term that violates English con-
sumer protection laws, and that the publication of Digital-
book.con's Lady Chatterley's Lover in England would infringe
upon the rights of the novel's English copyright owner. Digital-
book.com sells and sends copies of Lady Chatterley's Lover to two
people whose addresses (say, anonymous@aol.com and anony-
mous@msn.com) do not reveal their physical location but who,
See Post, 1995 J Online L, Article 3, para 39-40 (cited in note 3).
21 See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1376 (cited in note 3); Burk, 28 Conn L Rev
at 1123-34 (cited in note 3).
' See Post and Johnson, Borders, Spillovers, and Complexity at 38 (cited in note 3);
Post and Johnson, The New 'Civic Virtue' at 5-6 (cited in note 3); Burk, 28 Conn L Rev at
1123-34 (cited in note 3).
' See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1370, 1379 & n 33 (cited in note 3).
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unbeknownst to Digitalbook.com, live and receive the book in
Singapore and London, respectively.
The skeptics claim that it is difficult for courts in Singapore
or England to regulate disputes involving these transactions in
accordance with geographical choice-of-law rules. In addition,
they argue that English and Singaporean regulations will expose
Digitalbook.com to potentially inconsistent obligations. Finally,
the skeptics claim that Digitalbook.com can easily evade the Sin-
gaporean and English regulations by sending unstoppable digital
information into these countries from a locale beyond their en-
forcement jurisdiction.
On the normative side, the skeptics are concerned that the
application of English and Singaporean law to regulate Digital-
book.com's transactions constitutes an impermissible extraterri-
torial regulation of a U.S. corporation. Because Digitalbook.com
might bow to the English and Singaporean regulations, and be-
cause the company cannot limit its cyberspace information flows
by geography, the English and Singaporean regulations might
cause it to withdraw Lady Chatterley's Lover everywhere or to
raise its price. The English and Singaporean regulations would
thus affect Digitalbook.com's behavior in the United States and
adversely affect the purchasing opportunities of parties in other
countries. The skeptics believe these negative spillover effects of
the national regulations are illegitimate. They also think it is un-
fair for England and Singapore to apply their laws in this situa-
tion because Digitalbook.com had no way of knowing that it sold
and delivered a book to consumers in these countries.
I. "REAL-SPACE" JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The skeptics are in the grip of a nineteenth century territori-
alist conception of how "real space" is regulated and how "real-
space" conflicts of law are resolved.' This conception was repudi-
ated in the middle of this century.25 The skeptics' first mistake,
therefore, is to measure the feasibility and legitimacy of national
regulation of cyberspace against a repudiated yardstick. This Sec-
" The skeptics' views about territorialism and choice of law are remarkably similar to
Story's and Beale's. See, for example, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
7 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1841); Joseph Henry Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws or
Private International Law 118 (Harvard 1916).
' The claim that the territorialist premises of the traditional approach to choice of law
were flawed does not necessarily mean that the traditional choice-of-law rules that were
based on these premises cannot in some circumstances be justified on independent
grounds. See Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 Colum L Rev 1585,
1619-36 (1985).
1998] 1205
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tion offers a more accurate picture of real-space jurisdictional
conflict management as a prelude to analysis of the skeptics'
claims.
Three factors led to the overthrow of the traditional approach
to choice of law.26 The first was significant changes in the world.
Changes in transportation, communication, and in the scope of
corporate activity led to an unprecedented increase in multijuris-
dictional activity. These changes put pressure on the rigid terri-
torialist conception, which purported to identify a single legiti-
mate governing law for transborder activity based on discrete ter-
ritorial contacts. So too did the rise of the regulatory state, which
led to more caustic public policy differences among jurisdictions,
and which pressured the interested forum to apply local regula-
tions whenever possible.
A second factor, legal realism, contributed to the demise of
hermetic territorialism. All conflict-of-laws problems by definition
have connections to two or more territorial jurisdictions. The le-
gal realists showed that nothing in the logic of territorialism jus-
tified legal regulation by any one of these territories rather than
another.' They also argued that a forum's decision to apply for-
eign law was always determined by local domestic policies.29 This
established the theoretical foundation for the lex fori orientation
that has dominated choice of law ever since.
A third factor, legal positivism, exacerbated the problem of
finding a unique governing law in transactional cases. Courts
avoided many choice-of-law problems in such cases by applying
universal customary laws tied to no particular sovereign author-
ity, such as the law merchant, the law maritime, and the law of
The classic criticisms of the traditional view are Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on
the Conflict of Laws (Duke 1963), and Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws (Harvard 1949).
This is one reason why so many of the transformative midcentury constitutional
choice-of-law decisions involved public regulations rather than private law. See, for exam-
ple, Clay v Sun Insurance Office, Ltd, 377 US 179, 182-83 (1964) (insurance); Watson v
Employers Liability Assurance Corp, 348 US 66, 72-73 (1954) (insurance); United States v
Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 444 (2d Cir 1945) (antitrust); Pacific Employers
Insurance Co v Industrial Accident Commission of California, 306 US 493, 497 (1939)
(workmen's compensation); Alaska Packers Association v Industrial Accident Commission
6f California, 294 US 532, 538 (1935) (workmen's compensation); Bradford Electric Light
Co v Clapper, 286 US 145, 150-51 (1932) (workmen's compensation); Home Insurance Co v
Dick, 281 US 397,405-08 (1930) (insurance).
See, for example, Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases at 311-22, 354-70, 433-37 (cited
in note 26); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of
Laws, 31 Colun L Rev 368, 372-80 (1931); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the
Conflict of Laws 305-21 (Yale 1947).
' See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases at 35-36 (cited in note 26); Hessel E. Yn-
tema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 Yale L J 468,478 (1928).
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nations. ° But positivism's insistence on a sovereign source for
every rule of decision undermined judicial reliance on these
laws.31 It also contributed to the waning of universal choice-of-law
rules that courts applied in circumstances in which transnational
customary laws did not govern. In the United States, for example,
the general uniformity of choice-of-law approaches that charac-
terized the nineteenth century gave way in the twentieth century
to a plethora of choice-of-law regimes. 2 As different jurisdictions
adopted different choice-of-law regimes, the goal of a single gov-
erning law for transjurisdictional transactions was further frus-
trated.33
These factors did not completely undermine traditional views
about territorial regulation. But they did lead to an expansion of
the permissible bases for territorial jurisdiction. Today, the Con-
stitution permits a state to apply its law if it has a "significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state in-
terests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fun-
damentally unfair."' In practice, this standard is notoriously
easy to satisfy." It prohibits the application of local law only
when the forum state has no interest in the case because the sub-
stance of the lawsuit has no relationship to the state. Customary
international law limits on a nation's regulation of extraterrito-
rial events are less clear because there are few international deci-
sions on point, and because state practice does not reveal a set-
'See Leon E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law 39-44
(Fred B. Rothman 1983); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinter-
pretation, 144 U Pa L Rev 1245, 1280-81 (1996).
" See Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Mer-
chant, 28 Vand J Transnatl L 487, 491 (1995).
"The main approaches used by the several states today are the traditional vested
rights approach, interest analysis, the Second Restatement, comparative impairment, and
the better law approach. See Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials 203-
314 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1995). Even states that purport to use the same methodology-
for example, interest analysis or the Second Restatement-often do so in name only, with
important differences in practice.
"In the United States, the horizontal nonuniformity fostered by different choice-of-
law regimes in different states was exacerbated by the rule that federal courts sitting in
diversity apply state choice-of-law rules. See Klaxon Co v Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co, Inc, 313 US 487, 496 (1941).
"Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 818 (1985), quoting Allstate Insurance
Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 312-13 (1981).
"For example, in the case in which this modern standard was formulated, the Su-
preme Court held that Minnesota could apply its plaintiff-favoring insurance law to an ac-
cident in Wisconsin among Wisconsin residents based on the fact that the decedent
worked in Minnesota, the insurance company did business there, and the beneficiary
moved there from Wisconsin after the accident. See Hague, 449 US at 315-20. On the
weaknesses and uncertainties of the Hague test, see Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws at 140-43
(cited in note 32).
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tled custom. Nonetheless, it seems clear that customary interna-
tional law, like the United States Constitution, permits a nation
to apply its law to extraterritorial behavior with substantial local
effects.36 In addition, both the Constitution and international law
permit a nation or state to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of
a citizen or domiciliary. In short, in modern times a transaction
can legitimately be regulated by the jurisdiction where the trans-
action occurs, the jurisdictions where significant effects of the
transaction are felt, and the jurisdictions where the parties bur-
dened by the regulation are from.
This expansion of the permissible bases for the application of
local law has revolutionized conflict of laws in the second half of
this century. Any number of choice-of-law regimes are now con-
sistent with constitutional and international law. The earlier be-
lief in a unique governing law for all transnational activities has
given way to the view that more than one jurisdiction can legiti-
mately apply its law to the same transnational activity. 8 The uni-
formity promised by the traditional approach has thus been re-
placed by the reality of overlapping jurisdictional authority. This
means that the application of one jurisdiction's law often comes
at the expense of the nonapplication of the conflicting laws of
other interested jurisdictions. Because choice-of-law rules often
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and because a forum ap-
plies its own choice-of-law rules, the choice of forum is now often
critical to the selection of governing law. In this milieu, ex ante
notice of a specific governing law is no longer a realistic goal in
many transnational situations. Not surprisingly, the Constitution
and international law impose very weak notice requirements on
the application of local law to extraterritorial activity.
The Permanent Court of International Justice famously established a very weak ef-
fects test for extraterritorial jurisdiction and suggested a default rule that favored extra-
territorial jurisdiction. See The case of the S.S. "Lotus", 1927 P C I J (ser A) No 10 at 18-
25. Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law (ALI 1987), rec-
ognized the effects test as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, but added the caveat
that a state may not exercise such jurisdiction when it would be "unreasonable" to do so.
This reasonableness requirement has little basis in state practice and does not reflect cus-
tomary international law. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv Intl L J 101, 139-40 & nn 241-
42 (1998).
See, for example, Blackmer v United States, 284 US 421, 436 (1932); United States v
Reeh, 780 F2d 1541, 1543 n 2 (11th Cir 1986); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law § 402(2). International law also permits a nation to regulate extraterritorial
conduct that threatens local security, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
§ 402(3), and might permit a nation to regulate certain extraterritorial acts against its
citizens, id at comment g.
"See Shutts, 472 US at 823; Hague, 449 US at 307; Restatement (Third) of the For-
eign Relations Law § 403(3).
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This modern world of jurisdictional conflict poses obvious dif-
ficulties for participants in transnational transactions. To under-
stand these problems and their resolution, it is important to dis-
tinguish between default laws and mandatory laws. For present
purposes, a default law can be understood as one that presump-
tively governs a particular relationship or transaction, but that
can be modified or circumvented by the parties in the relation-
ship or transaction. The default laws of different countries can
create a conflict of laws. For example, the estate of a U.S. na-
tional who dies intestate in England, his domicile, could poten-
tially be subject to the succession rules of either country. Simi-
larly, a contract made in one country for delivery of products in
another could be subject to the remedies regime of either country.
Parties in such transnational relationships can alleviate
choice-of-law uncertainty with respect to default rules by con-
tracting for specific terms, by selecting a governing law, or both.39
Most contractual choice-of-law clauses govern the contracts
within which they are embedded. But the scope of this private le-
gal control is not limited to traditional contractual issues. In
many circumstances, parties can agree to a governing law for
torts and related actions that arise from their contractual rela-
tions. 0 They can also specify the governing law for matters
ranging from intellectual property to trusts and estates to inter-
nal corporate affairs.4
The possibilities for private legal ordering are not limitless.
Every nation has mandatory laws that govern particular transac-
tions or relationships regardless of the wishes of the parties. The
primary justifications for such laws are paternalism and protec-
tion of third parties.42 Mandatory laws range from limits on con-
' Some courts will not enforce choice-of-law agreements in which the "chosen state
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other rea-
sonable basis for the parties' choice." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2Xa)
(1971). This restriction has less force in transnational contexts in which there are often
good reasons for parties to choose a neutral law unrelated to the parties. See id § 187
comment f.
See, for example, Moses v Business Card Express, Inc, 929 F2d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir
1991).
" See, for example, Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Es-
tates of Deceased Persons, Art 5, 28 ILM 146, 150 (1989) (providing that an individual
may designate either the law of habitual residence or the law of nationality to govern suc-
cession); Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition, Art
6, 23 ILM 1389 (1984) ("A trust shall be governed by the law chosen by the settlor.");
McDermott Inc v Lewis, 531 A2d 206, 215 (Del 1987) (holding that law of place of incorpo-
ration governs internal corporate affairs); William Grantham, Comment, The Arbitrability
of International Intellectual Property Disputes, 14 Berkeley J Intl L 173, 190-95 (1996)
(describing how parties' choice of law governs intellectual property disputes).
2 See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 58-77, 145-63 (Har-
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tractual capacity to criminal law to securities and antitrust law.
Like default laws, they differ in content and scope from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. Unlike conflicts of default laws, conflicts of
mandatory laws cannot be resolved easily by private contract.'
They can, in theory, be resolved by public contract-international
agreements that embrace uniform international rules" or uni-
form choice-of-law rules." Such solutions are increasingly promi-
nent but still relatively rare. Moreover, these attempts at inter-
national uniformity are often limited to default rules, and are lit-
tered with mandatory law exceptions.46
This discussion shows that conflicts of law can arise when
parties to a transnational transaction do not specify the govern-
ing default law, or when the transaction implicates a mandatory
law that conflicts with the otherwise-applicable law. Absent a
governing international law, transnational activity in these con-
texts will usually be governed by the law of a single jurisdiction.47
And absent international choice-of-law rules, the forum's choice-
of-law rules will determine the governing law. In regulatory con-
texts, the forum will invariably apply local law.4" But regardless
of which substantive law the forum applies, the application of
that law will frequently create spillover effects on activities in
other countries and on the ability of other interested nations to
apply their own law. In our increasingly integrated world, these
spillover effects are likely to extend to many countries.49
vard 1993).
See, for example, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA v MIV Sky Reefer, 515 US 528,
540-41 (1995) (noting that transnational parties cannot reduce their liability under the
Carriage of Goods at Sea Act by contracting around its provisions); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 637 n 19 (1985) (noting that transna-
tional parties cannot contract around the Sherman Act). Private parties can, of course, cir-
cumvent mandatory laws to the extent that they can shift the location or effects of their
activities beyond the mandatory law's enforceable scope. For further discussion, see note
178.
" See, for example, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods ("CISG"), UN Doc A/CONF.97/18, reprinted at 19 ILM 671 (1980). A related solu-
tion is to develop uniform laws like the Uniform Commercial Code, which minimize choice-
of-law difficulties by ensuring that every jurisdiction's local law is (in theory) the same.
See, for example, Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
("Rome Convention"), June 19, 1980 (80/934/EEC) 1980 OJ (L266/1), p 1.
"See, for example, id Arts 3(3), 5(2), 6(1), and 7(1)-(2) (acknowledging various manda-
tory law restrictions on choice of law governing contracts).
" I say "usually" because sometimes there will be parallel litigation of the same mat-
ter in two nations, each of which attempts to apply its own law. See, for example, Laker
Airways Ltd v Sabena, 731 F2d 909, 917-20 (DC Cir 1984).
, See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonable-
ness: Essays in Private International Law 5 (Clarendon 1996).
41 In my discussion here and throughout the Article, I shall follow the skeptics in as-
suming that the spillovers produced by unilateral regulation of transnational activity are
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Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Hart-
ford Fire Insurance Co v California." The Court held that the
concerted refusal by London reinsurers to sell certain types of
reinsurance to insurers in the United States violated the
Sherman Act. The reinsurers' acts in England were legal under
English law. But the Court determined that the reinsurers were
nonetheless subject to U.S. regulation because their actions "pro-
duced substantial effect[s]" in the United States." U.S. law thus
regulated the activities of English companies in England at the
expense of the nonapplication of English law. Similarly, had an
English court applied English law to adjudge the reinsurers' acts
to be legal, it would have produced spillover effects on consumers
in the United States, and would have come at the expense of the
nonapplication of U.S. law. No matter which law governed the
reinsurers' acts, the application of that law would have produced
spillover effects on the English reinsurers' activities in other ju-
risdictions, and on the activities of persons in other jurisdictions
adversely affected by the reinsurers' acts.
A similar phenomenon occurs in many domestic and interna-
tional conflicts contexts. For example, the European Commission
recently imposed strict conditions on a merger (already approved
by the Federal Trade Commission) between two American com-
panies with no manufacturing facilities in Europe.52 Minnesota
applied its pro-plaintiff stacking rules for automobile insurance
coverage to an accident in Wisconsin among Wisconsin resi-
dents.' A United States federal grand jury ordered the local
branch of a foreign bank, a nonparty, to disclose bank records in
the Bahamas in possible violation of Bahamian law."4 California
applied its workmen's compensation law to benefit an employee of
a California corporation who suffered a tort while working in
Alaska-even though Alaska purported to make its worker's
compensation scheme exclusive, and even though the employ-
ment contract specified that Alaska law governed.55 New York
negative spillovers. This will not always be true, but it will usually be true in situations in
which one state regulates extraterritorial conduct that the territorial government would
regulate differently.
509 US 764 (1993).
Id at 796.
See McDonnell Douglas-Boeing Link Gets Europe Approval, NY Times D4 (July 31,
1997).
See Hague, 449 US at 306, 319-20.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States v Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F2d
1384, 1391 (11th Cir 1982).
' See Alaska Packers, 294 US at 539-44.
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applied its tort law to a car accident in Canada.56 California taxed
a British corporation based on the California portion of its world
profits.57
In these situations and countless others, one jurisdiction
regulates extraterritorial conduct in a way that invariably affects
individual behavior and regulatory efforts in other jurisdictions.
These spillover effects constitute the central problem of modern
conflict of laws. The problem is pervasive. It is also inevitable, be-
cause the price of eliminating these spillovers-abolishing na-
tional or subnational lawmaking entities, or eliminating transna-
tional activity-is prohibitively high. Most of the dizzying array
of modern choice-of-law methodologies are devoted to minimizing
these spillovers while at the same time preserving the sovereign
prerogative to regulate effects within national borders." Interna-
tional harmonization efforts seek to achieve similar aims, often at
the expense of national prerogatives.59
There is widespread debate about which approach, or combi-
nation of approaches, is preferable. Resolution of this debate is
less important for present purposes than two uncontested as-
sumptions that underlie it. The first assumption is that in the ab-
sence of consensual international solutions, prevailing concepts of
territorial sovereignty permit a nation to regulate the local effects
of extraterritorial conduct even if this regulation produces spill-
over effects in other jurisdictions. The second assumption is that
such spillover effects are a commonplace consequence of the uni-
lateral application of any particular law to transnational activity
in our increasingly interconnected world. It is against this back-
ground that the skeptics' descriptive and normative claims must
be assessed.
IlI. IS CYBERSPACE REGULATION FEASIBLE?
This Section argues that the skeptics' claims about the infea-
sibility of national regulation of cyberspace rest on an underap-
'See Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473, 240 NYS2d 743, 191 NE2d 279,284-85 (1963).
See Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board, 512 US 298, 310-15 (1994).
This is the goal, for example, of such different approaches as the Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law's interest-balancing approach, see Restatement (Third) of the For-
eign Relations Law § 403; William Baxter's comparative impairment approach, see Wil-
liam F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan L Rev 1, 4-20 (1963); Larry
Kramer's multistate canons of construction, see Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 Colum L Rev 277, 319-38 (1990); and Lea Brilmayer's strategy to maximize state policy
objectives, see Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws at 169-218 (cited in note 32).
See David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization
Claims, in Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmoniza-
tion 41, 43-50 (MIT 1996).
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preciation of the realities of modern conflict of laws, and of the le-
gal and technological tools available to resolve multijurisdictional
cyberspace conflicts. From the perspective of jurisdiction and
choice of law, regulation of cyberspace transactions is no less fea-
sible than regulation of other transnational transactions.
A. Default Laws and Private Ordering in Cyberspace
Cyberspace transactions that implicate default laws, like
other transnational transactions that implicate such laws, are
subject to private legal ordering. The architecture of cyberspace
facilitates this private ordering and thus enables cyberspace par-
ticipants to avoid many transnational conflicts of law.
At the most basic level, private ordering is facilitated by the
technical standards that define and limit cyberspace."° To partici-
pate in the Internet function known as the World Wide Web, us-
ers must consent to the TCP/IP standards that define the Inter-
net as well as to the HTML standards that more particularly de-
fine the Web. Similarly, sending e-mail over the Internet requires
the sender to use TCP/IP standards and particular e-mail proto-
cols. One's experience of cyberspace is further defined and limited
by the more particular communication standards embedded in
software.6' For example, within the range of what TCP/IP and
HTML permit, an individual's communication via the World Wide
Web will be shaped and limited by (among many other things)
her choice of browsers and search engines. These and countless
other technical standard choices order behavior in cyberspace. In
this sense, access to different cyberspace networks and communi-
ties is always conditioned on the accessors' consent to the array of
technical standards that define these networks and communities.
Technical standards cannot comprehensively specify accept-
able behavior in cyberspace. Within the range of what these
standards permit, information flows might violate network norms
or territorial laws. Many network norms are promulgated and en-
' For more general discussions of this point, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 Tex L Rev 553
(1998); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L J 869, 895-
99 (1996); M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeep-
ers in Cyberspace, 1996 U Chi Legal F 335, 339-47; Post, 1995 J Online L, Article 3, paras
20-21 (cited in note 3).
"' Of course, computer hardware-keyboards, monitors, modems, disk drives, proces-
sors, and the like-also affects how individuals experience cyberspace. Many software in-
structions that are interpreted by a computer could be instantiated in hardware rather
than software. For the most part, however, hardware is less significant than software in
creating and shaping one's experience of cyberspace. See Katsh, 1996 U Chi Legal F at
339-43 (cited in note 60).
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forced informally. A more formal method to establish private le-
gal orders in cyberspace is to condition access to particular net-
works on consent to a particular legal regime.
This regime could take several forms. It could be a local, na-
tional, or international law. When you buy a Dell computer
through the company's web page from anywhere in the world, you
agree that "[alny claim relating to, and the use of, this Site and
the materials contained herein is governed by the laws of the
state of Texas."62 Alternatively, the chosen law could be a free-
standing model law attached to no particular sovereign but avail-
able to be incorporated by contract. For example, parties to a
commercial transaction over the Internet could agree that their
transaction is governed by UNIDROIT Principles or the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.' Or the govern-
ing law could be the contractual terms themselves.' Waivers and
exclusions operate as private law in this way. So too do chat
rooms, discussion lists, and local area networks that condition
participation on the user's consent to community norms specified
in a contract.
Cyberspace architecture can also help to establish other as-
pects of a private legal order. Through conditioned access, cyber-
space users can consent to havE subsequent disputes resolved by
courts, arbitrators, systems operators, or even "virtual magis-
trates.' They can also establish private enforcement regimes.
Technical standards operate as an enforcer of sorts by defining
and limiting cyberspace activity. For example, software filters
can block or condition access to certain information, and various
technologies perform compliance monitoring functions.6 In addi-
tion, the gatekeeper of each cyberspace community can cut off en-
try for noncompliance with the community rules, or punish a user
for bad acts by drawing on a bond (perhaps simply a credit card)
put up as a condition on the user's entry. 7
<www.dell.com/del/legal/disclwww.htm> (visited Apr 1, 1998).
' International Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT"), Principles
of International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT 1994); ICC, Uniform customs and
practice for documentary credits, ICC Pub No 500 (1993).
Such a regime will invariably be underspecified and will require supplementation by
some default law regime.
' "Virtual Magistrate" is the name of the decisionmaker in a relatively new online
project "for resolving disputes that arise on worldwide computer networks about online
messages, postings, and files ... ." The Virtual Magistrate Project Concept Paper, available
online at <vmag.vcilp.org/docsvmpaper.html> (visited Apr 1, 1998).
See Reidenberg, 76 Tex L Rev at 558-68 (cited in note 60).
' See Jack Goldsmith and Lawrence Lessig, Grounding the Virtual Magistrate 4,
available online at <www.law.vill.edu/ncair/disres/groundvm.htm> (visited Apr 1, 1998).
For further development of these points, see Section V.
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Many have proposed a structure for private legal ordering of
cyberspace along the lines just sketched.' There is nothing re-
markable about this structure. It differs little from the legal
structure of other private groups, such as churches, merchants,
families, clubs, and corporations, which have analogous consent-
based governing laws, dispute resolution mechanisms, and pri-
vate enforcement regimes.69 But just as private ordering is often
not a comprehensive solution to the regulation of "real-space" pri-
vate groups, it will not be a comprehensive solution to the regula-
tion of cyberspace either.
In part this is because it remains an open question how to
generate consent across cyberspace networks. Conditioning ac-
cess on consent to a governing legal regime is relatively easy at
the entry point of a cyberspace network. In theory, it is just as
easy to generate such consent at the interface between networks.
It is commonplace to click on a hypertext link and be greeted by a
message that conditions further access on presentation of an
identification code, or credit card number, or personal informa-
tion such as age and address. A similar demand for consent to a
particular legal regime could be added as a condition for access.
However, this process might become confusing; the technological
and conceptual details of consenting to and coordinating different
legal regimes as one works one's way through dozens of cyber-
space networks remain to be worked out.7° In addition, the gen-
eration of legal consent across networks will impose time and
other costs that are anathema to many cyberspace users.
An important additional difficulty is that many cyberspace
activities affect non-cyberspace participants with whom ex ante
consent to a private legal regime will not be possible. Cyberspace
is not, as the skeptics often assume, a self-enclosed regime. A
communication in cyberspace often has consequences for persons
outside the computer network in which the communication took
place. For example: a book uploaded on the Net can violate an
author's copyright; a chat room participant can defame someone
outside the chat room; terrorists can promulgate bomb making or
kidnapping tips; merchants can conspire to fix prices by e-mail; a
corporation can issue a fraudulent security; a pornographer can
See, for example, Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1387-91 (cited in note 3);
I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace', 55 U Pitt L Rev 993, 1028-33
(1994).
See generally Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U Chi L Rev 133, 165-97 (1996).
"' See Goldsmith and Lessig, Grounding the Virtual Magistrate at 3-4 (cited in note
67); Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1395-1400 & nn 102-03 (cited in note 3).
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sell kiddie porn; Internet gambling can decrease in-state gam-
bling revenues and cause family strife; and so on. In these and
many other ways, communications via cyberspace produce harm-
ful, real-world effects on those who have not consented to the pri-
vate ordering of the cyberspace community.
Finally, even if the hurdles to consent can be surmounted,
consent-based legal orders are limited by a variety of national
mandatory law restrictions.7 These mandatory laws define who
may consent to these private regimes. For example, they prevent
persons of certain ages from entering into certain types of con-
tracts. They also limit the form and scope of such consent. The
consideration requirement and limitations on liquidated damages
clauses fall into this category, as do requirements that the law
chosen by the parties have a reasonable relationship to the sub-
ject matter of the contract. Some mandatory laws also limit the
internal and external activities of the group's activities. Criminal
law, for example, falls in this category.
Private legal ordering thus has the potential to resolve many,
but not all, of the challenges posed by multijurisdictional cyber-
space activity. Cyberspace activities for which ex ante consent to
a governing legal regime is either infeasible or unenforceable are
not amenable to private ordering. Such activities remain subject
to the skeptics' concerns about multiple or extraterritorial na-
tional regulation.72
B. The Limits of Enforcement Jurisdiction
The skeptics' concerns are further attenuated, however, by
limitations on every nation's ability to enforce its laws. A nation
can purport to regulate activity that takes place anywhere. The
Island of Tobago can enact a law that purports to bind the rights
of the whole world.7" But the effective scope of this law depends
on Tobago's ability to enforce it. And in general a nation can only
enforce its laws against: (i) persons with a presence or assets in
the nation's territory; (ii) persons over whom the nation can ob-
tain personal jurisdiction and enforce a default judgment against
abroad; or (iii) persons whom the nation can successfully extra-
dite.74
" The skeptics challenge the normative basis for nations to apply mandatory laws to
regulate the private legal regimes of cyberspace. I consider these arguments in Section IV.
I discuss private legal ordering in cyberspace in greater detail in Section V.
See Buchanan v Rucker, 9 East 192, 103 Eng Rep 546, 547 (KB 1808) ("Can the Is-
land of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?").
"' I set aside for present purposes two other relatively rare methods of extraterritorial
enforcement: military invasion, see, for example, United States v Noriega, 746 F Supp
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A defendant's physical presence or assets within the territory
remains the primary basis for a nation or state to enforce its
laws. The large majority of persons who transact in cyberspace
have no presence or assets in the jurisdictions that wish to regu-
late their information flows in cyberspace. Such regulations are
thus likely to apply primarily to Internet service providers and
Internet users with a physical presence in the regulating jurisdic-
tion. Cyberspace users in other territorial jurisdictions will indi-
rectly feel the effect of the regulations to the extent that they are
dependent on service or content providers with a presence in the
regulating jurisdiction.75 But for almost all users, there will be no
threat of extraterritorial legal liability because of a lack of pres-
ence in the regulating jurisdictions.
A nation or state can also enforce its laws over an entity with
no local presence or assets if it can obtain personal jurisdiction
over the entity and enforce a local default judgment against that
entity abroad. The domestic interstate context presents a much
greater threat in this regard than does the international context.
This is because the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a state
to enforce the default judgment of a sister state that had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.76 This threat is attenuated, how-
ever, by constitutional limits on a state's assertion of personal ju-
risdiction. The Due Process Clauses prohibit a state from assert-
ing personal jurisdiction over an entity with no local presence
unless the entity has purposefully directed its activities to the fo-
rum state and the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable."
Application of this standard to cyberspace activities presents
special difficulties. Under standard assumptions about cyber-
1506 (S D Fla 1990), and secondary boycotts, see, for example, Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton Act"), Pub L No 104-114, 110 Stat
785, codified at 22 USCA §§ 6021-91 (1994 & Supp 1998) (sanctioning nations that engage
in certain transactions with Cuba).
" I explain below why local regulation of service or content providers that produces
multijurisdictional spillover effects is legitimate and fair, see Section IV.B; my goal for
now is to show that the scope of national regulation of cyberspace is much narrower than
the skeptics claim.
" See US Const, Art IV, § 1; Roger C. Crampton, et al, Conflict of Laws: Cases-
Comments-Questions 735-37 (West 5th ed 1993).
' See Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Court, 480 US 102, 108-09 (1987). This is
the test for specific jurisdiction; such jurisdiction is limited to cases in which the cause of
action arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum. A court may also
assert general personal jurisdiction over a defendant for a cause of action that accrued
anywhere. General jurisdiction is normally limited to the defendant's domicile and any-
where else where it may have "continuous and systematic... contacts." Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Columbia v Hall, 466 US 408, 414-16 (1984). Courts are unanimous that a web
page accessible in a jurisdiction does not by itself establish general jurisdiction there. See,
for example, Weber v Jolly Hotels, 977 F Supp 327, 333-34 (D NJ 1997).
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space architecture, persons can upload or transmit information
knowing that it could reach any and all jurisdictions, but not
knowing which particular jurisdiction it might reach. Can every
state where these transmissions appear assert specific personal
jurisdiction over the agent of the information under the purpose-
ful availment and reasonableness tests?
Full consideration of this issue is far beyond this Article's
scope.7' I simply wish to point out why there is relatively little
reason at present, and even less reason in the near future, to be-
lieve that the mere introduction of information into cyberspace
will by itself suffice for personal jurisdiction over the agent of the
transmission in every state where the information appears. Most
courts have required something more than mere placement of in-
formation on a web page in one state as a basis for personal ju-
risdiction in another state where the web page is accessed.79 For a
variety of reasons, these decisions have limited specific personal
jurisdiction to cases in which there are independent indicia that
the out-of-state defendant knowingly and purposefully directed
the effects of out-of-state conduct to a particular state where the
acts were deemed illegal.
Given the skeptics' assumptions about cyberspace architec-
ture, this conclusion appears appropriate. It seems unfair to ex-
pose a content provider to personal jurisdiction in all fift states
for the mere act of uploading information on a computer if she
cannot take affordable precautions to avoid simultaneous multi-
jurisdictional effects. But we shall see below that the skeptics' ar-
chitectual assumptions are inaccurate. It is already possible for
content providers to take measures to achieve significant control
over information flows. And filtering and identification technol-
ogy promise greater control at less cost." In cyberspace as in real
space, the ultimate meaning of "purposeful availment" and "rea-
sonableness" will depend on the cost and feasibility of informa-
tion flow control.8 " As such control becomes more feasible and less
costly, personal jurisdiction over cyberspace activities will become
"8 For broader treatments, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41
Vill L Rev 1, 13-25 (1996); Burk, 28 Conn L Rev at 1107-23 (cited in note 3).
" See, for example, Cybersell, Inc v Cybersell, Inc, 130 F3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir 1997);
Weber, 977 F Supp at 334; Panavision International, LP v Toeppen, 938 F Supp 616, 622
(C D Cal 1996). For more comprehensive analyses of the many Internet personal jurisdic-
tion cases, see Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More
is Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 SC L Rev 925 (1998); Christopher
W. Meyer, Note, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction Around the Whole
Wide World?, 54 Wash & Lee L Rev 1269 (1997).
See Section III.D.
8 See Burk, 28 Conn L Rev at 1117-20 (cited in note 3).
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functionally identical to personal jurisdiction over real-space ac-
tivities.
This detour into the technicalities of personal jurisdiction
was necessitated by a worry about the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of local default judgments against nonlocal cyberspace us-
ers within the American federal system. Such concerns are less
pronounced in the international context. In contrast to the do-
mestic interstate context, customary international law imposes
few enforceable controls on a country's assertion of personal ju-
risdiction, and there are few treaties on the subject. 2 However,
also in contrast to domestic law, there is no full faith and credit
obligation to enforce foreign judgments in the international
sphere.' If one country exercises personal jurisdiction on an ex-
orbitant basis, the resulting judgment is unlikely to be enforced
in another country.' In addition, local public policy exceptions to
the enforcement of foreign judgments are relatively commonplace
in the international sphere, especially when the foreign judgment
flies in the face of the enforcing state's regulatory regime.' For
these reasons, there is little concern that a foreign default judg-
I should emphasize the term "enforceable" here, because many commentators talk
as if there are (or should be) customary international law limits on exorbitant assertions
of personal jurisdiction. See, for example, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law § 421. This talk does not appear to be supported by state practice followed from a
sense of legal obligation, the usual requirements for a rule of customary international law.
The Brussels and Lugano Conventions are treaties that specify the legal bases for per-
sonal jurisdiction among members of the European Union. See Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commerical Matters, Sept 27, 1968, 1990
OJ (C 189) 2 (consolidated); Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept 16, 1988, 1988 OJ (L 319) 9. These rare
treaties on the subject prove the point that there is no effective or established customary
international law that regulates personal jurisdiction, for the Brussels-Lugano regime
permits exorbitant assertions of personal jurisdiction against defendants from non-
European countries. See Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and
in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich L Rev 1195, 1211 (1984).
The U.S. Constitutions Full Faith and Credit obligation does not extend to judg-
ments of foreign nations. See US Const, Art IV, § 1 (requiring states to give full faith and
credit to acts, records, and proceedings "of every other State") (emphasis added). The en-
forceability of these judgments is generally regulated by state law and is weaker than the
obligation imposed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Gary B. Born, International
Civil Litigation in United States Courts: Commentary & Materials 938-62 (Kluwer 3d ed
1996). In Europe, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which regulate the enforcement
of foreign judgments among European Union members, are again an exception to the gen-
eral rule.
See Born, International Civil Litigation at 942-43 (cited in note 83) (discussing ex-
amples from Japan, Germany, and England).
See, for example, Bachchan v India Abroad Publications Inc, 154 Misc 2d 228, 585
NYS2d 661, 664-65 (NY Sup Ct 1992) (declining to enforce English money judgment for li-
bel against a newspaper whose activities would have been protected by the First Amend-
ment in the United States). See generally Born, International Civil Litigation at 942-43
(cited in note 83).
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ment will be enforceable against cyberspace users who live out-
side the regulating jurisdiction.
The final way that a nation can enforce its regulations
against persons outside its jurisdiction is by seeking extradition.
In the United States, extradition among the several states is
regulated by Article IV of the Constitution and the federal extra-
dition law." As a general matter, State A.must accede to the
proper demand of State B for the surrender of a fugitive who
committed an act in State B that State B considers a crime.
Nonetheless, a person who in State A transmits information flows
that appear in and constitute a crime in State B will not likely be
subject to extradition to State B under these provisions. This is
because the extradition obligation only extends to fugitives who
have fled State B, and these terms have long been limited to per-
sons who were physically present in the demanding state at the
time of the crime's commission." A different, but equally forceful,
limitation applies to international extradition. International ex-
tradition is governed largely by treaty." A pervasive feature of
modern extradition treaties is the principle of double criminality.
This principle requires that the charged offense be criminal in
both the requesting and the requested jurisdictions.89 This princi-
ple, and its animating rationale, make it unlikely that there will
be international cooperation in the enforcement of exorbitant
unilateral criminal regulations of cyberspace events.
This review of transnational enforcement jurisdiction makes
clear that the skeptics exaggerate the threat of multiple regula-
tion of cyberspace information flows. This threat must be meas-
ured by a regulation's enforceable scope, not by its putative scope.
And the enforceable scope is relatively narrow. It extends only to
individual users or system operators with presence or assets in
the enforcement jurisdiction, or (in the U.S.) to entities that take
extra steps to target cyberspace information flows to states where
such information flows are illegal. Such regulatory exposure is a
significant concern for cyberspace participants. But it is precisely
how regulatory exposure operates in "real space." And it is far
See US Const, Art IV, § 2, cl 2; 18 USC § 3182 (1994).
See Innes v Tobin, 240 US 127, 131 (1916); Hyatt v People, 188 US 691, 711-12
(1903); Gee v Kansas, 912 F2d 414, 418 (10th Cir 1990). This jurisdictional limitation does
not apply, of course, when a person in one state commits a federal crime in another. See
United States v Thomas, 74 F3d 701, 709-10 (6th Cir 1996).
For an overview, see IA. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester
1971).
"See John T. Soma, Thomas F. Muther, Jr., and Heidi M.L. Brissette, Transnational
Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 Harv J Leg
317, 323-26 (1997).
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less significant than the skeptics' hyperbolic claim that all users
of the Web will be simultaneously subject to all national regula-
tions."
Even with these limitations, the skeptics worry that an indi-
vidual cyberspace content provider in one jurisdiction faces poten-
tial liability in another jurisdiction when she places information
on the Internet. This potential liability can become an unforeseen
reality when the provider travels to the regulating jurisdiction, or
moves assets there. Such potential liability in turn affects the
providers' activities at home and thus can be viewed as a weak
form of extraterritorial regulation. This form of regulation is a
theoretical possibility, but it should not be exaggerated. No na-
tion has as yet imposed liability on a content provider for unfore-
seen effects in an unknown jurisdiction. The threat of such liabil-
ity will lessen as content providers continue to gain means to con-
trol information flows.9' It is also conceivable that weak norma-
tive limitations might exist or develop to prevent a jurisdiction
from regulating local effects that were truly unforeseeable or un-
controllable.92 The point for now is that even in the absence of
such limits, this potential threat of liability is relatively insignifi-
cant and does not come close to the skeptics' broad descriptive
claims about massive multiple regulation of individual users.
C. Indirect Regulation of Extraterritorial Activity
Indeed, if the limits on enforcement jurisdiction support any
of the skeptics' descriptive claims, it is their somewhat different
claim that because of the potential for regulation evasion, cyber-
space transactions are beyond the regulatory powers of territorial
governments." Cyberspace content providers can, at some cost,
shift the source of their information flows to jurisdictions beyond
the enforceable scope of national regulation and thus continue in-
formation transmissions into the regulating jurisdiction.' For ex-
ample, they can relocate in geographical space, or employ telnet
or anonymous remailers to make the geographical source of their
See, for example, Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1374 (cited in note 3).
'4 This is the topic of the next Section.
I examine this normative question in Section IV.C.
This component of the skeptics' argument is in tension with their concerns about the
threat of multiple regulation. If, as they claim, cyberspace users can easily relocate the
source of their transmissions to evade legal enforcement, and if, as they further claim, the
physical location of parties transacting in cyberspace is "indeterminate both ex ante and ex
post," see Post and Johnson, Borders, Spillovers, and Complexity at 3 (cited in note 3),
then cyberspace users have little to fear from multiple national regulation.
"See Post, 1995 J Online L, Article 3 at para 40 (cited in note 3).
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content difficult to discern.95 These and related regulatory evasion
techniques can make it difficult for a nation to regulate the extra-
territorial supply side of harmful cyberspace activity.
Regulation evasion of this sort is not limited to cyberspace.
For example, corporations reincorporate to avoid mandatory laws
and criminals launder money offshore. Closer to point, offshore
regulation evasion has been a prominent characteristic of other
communication media. For example, Radio-Free Europe broad-
cast from western Europe into the former Soviet Union but
lacked a regulatable presence there.96 Similarly, television signals
are sometimes broadcast from abroad by an entity with no local
presence. The extraterritorial source of these and many other
non-cyberspace activities is beyond the enforceable scope of local
regulation. But this does not mean that local regulation is ineffi-
cacious. In cyberspace as in real space, offshore regulation eva-
sion does not prevent a nation from regulating the extraterrito-
rial activity.
This is so because a nation can regulate people and equip-
ment in its territory to control the local effects of the extraterrito-
rial activity. Such indirect regulation is how nations have, with
varying degrees of success, regulated local harms caused by other
communications media with offshore sources and no local pres-
ence.97 And it is how nations have begun to regulate local harms
caused by offshore Internet content providers. For example, na-
tions penalize in-state end users who obtain and use illegal con-
tent or who otherwise participate in an illegal cyberspace trans-
action.98 They also regulate the local means through which for-
'Telnet allows a computer user to log into a remote computer over the Internet. Once
connected to the foreign computer, the user can perform any Internet function, such as
sending e-mail or "telnetting" to yet other servers, as though she were logged on to a ter-
minal at the foreign computer's location. An anonymous remailer is a service that allows
the sender of an e-mail to remain anonymous by sending the message through an inter-
mediary that strips the message of the identifying characteristics of the original sender.
The receiver of the e-mail can respond to the e-mail by sending an e-mail to the interme-
diary, which then forwards it to the sender.
See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power:
Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 World Pol 336, 343-46 (1991).
Id.
Consider two of many examples. Pending legislation in the United States Congress
would impose criminal penalties on persons in the United States who gamble on the
Internet. See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1998, S Amend 3266 to S 2260, 105th
Cong, 2d Sess (July 22, 1998); Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1998, HR 4427, 105th
Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 6, 1998). Chinese law punishes in-state Internet users who access or
transmit a broader array of prohibited information. See Computer Information Network
and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations (approved by the State
Council on December 11, 1997 and promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security on De-
cember 30, 1997), available online at <www.gilc.org/speech/china/net-regs-1297.html>
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eign content is transmitted. For example, they impose screening
obligations on in-state Internet service providers and other enti-
ties that supply or transmit information.9 Or they regulate in-
state hardware and software through which such transmissions
are received. °" Or they regulate the local financial intermediaries
that make commercial transactions on the Internet possible."0 '
These and related regulations of domestic persons and prop-
erty make it more costly, and thus more difficult, for in-state us-
ers to obtain content from, or transact with, regulation evaders
abroad. In this fashion a nation can indirectly regulate the extra-
territorial supply of prohibited content even though the source of
the content is beyond its enforcement jurisdiction and even
though it cannot easily stop transmission at the border. These
various forms of indirect regulation will not be perfect in the
sense of eliminating regulation evasion. But few regulations are
perfect in this sense, and regulation need not be perfect in this
sense to be effective.0 2 The question is always whether the regu-
lation will heighten the costs of the activity sufficiently to achieve
(visited Sept 11, 1998).
"For example, a new German law imposes liability on Internet service providers if
they knowingly offer a venue for content illegal in Germany and fail to use technically
possible and reasonable means to block it. See Germany to Enforce Child-Friendly Inter-
net, Chi Trib 4 (July 5, 1997). Australia is about to implement a similar law. See Elec-
tronic Frontiers Australia, Internet Regulation in Australia, available online at
<www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/censl.html> (visited Sept 10, 1998). In the United States,
pending federal Internet gambling legislation would authorize the federal government to
order service providers, at risk of penalty, to discontinue the availability of illegal gam-
bling sites. See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1998, S Amend 3266 to S 2260 (cited
in note 98). Legislation is also pending that would require senders of unsolicited commer-
cial e-mail to identify themselves in a way that would enable Internet service providers to
filter such messages. See Jeri Clausing, Compressed Data; House E-Mail Effort Raises
Censorship Issues, NY Times D3 (Aug 10, 1998). And some states have held Internet
service providers liable for facilitating the transmission of illegal extraterritorial content
into the regulating jurisdiction. See, for example, Stratton Oakmont, Inc v Prodigy Serv-
ices Co, 1995 WL 323710, *4-5 (NY Sup Ct).
'"This form of regulation is explored in detail in Section III.D.
'Compare Matt Beer, The wagers of the Web; Lawsuit could unravel on-line gaming
industry, San Fran Examiner B1 (Aug 17, 1998) (describing lawsuit by Internet bettor
against credit card companies that financed online gambling).
'As Lessig notes:
A regulation need not be absolutely effective to be sufficiently effective. It need not
raise the cost of the prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that
activity quite substantially. If regulation increases the cost of access to this kind of
information, it will reduce access to this information, even if it doesn't reduce it to
zero.... If government regulation had to show that it was perfect before it was justi-
fied, then indeed there would be little regulation ofcyberspace, or of real space either.
But regulation, whether for the good or the bad, has a lower burden to meet.
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1403, 1405 (1996).
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its acceptable control from whatever normative perspective is ap-
propriate.
In the cyberspace regulation context, the answer to this
question depends on empirical and technological issues that are
unresolved and that will vary from context to context. The prodi-
gious criticism of and lobbying efforts against proposed regulation
of (among other things) digital goods, Internet gambling, and en-
cryption technology suggest that governments can raise the costs
of many cyberspace transactions to a significant degree. And of
course unilateral national regulation is one of many regulation
strategies at a nation's disposal.0 ° The point for now is simply
that offshore regulation evasion does not, as the skeptics think,
undermine a nation's ability to regulate cyberspace transactions.
Although a nation will sometimes have difficulty in imposing li-
ability on extraterritorial content providers, it can still signifi-
cantly regulate the local effects of these providers' activities
through laws aimed at local persons and entities.
D. Filtering
We have seen that the skeptics' worries about multiple or ex-
traterritorial regulation of cyberspace activity do not extend to
matters for which it is feasible and legal for cyberspace communi-
ties to establish private legal regimes, or to matters beyond a na-
tion's enforcement jurisdiction.
But the possibility of extraterritorial and multiple regula-
tions remains. Consider the Bavarian Justice Ministry's threat in
December of 1995 to prosecute CompuServe for carrying online
discussion groups containing material that violated German anti-
pornography laws. 44 CompuServe responded by blocking access
to these discussion groups in Germany. Because of the state of
then-available technology, this action had the effect of blocking
access to these discussion groups for all CompuServe users
worldwide.' ° This is precisely what the skeptics fear from unilat-
eral regulation of cyberspace. Germany enforced a mandatory law
against an international access provider with a presence (office,
staff, servers, etc.) in Germany. Faced with multiple regulatory
regimes in the many places where it did business, CompuServe
bowed to the most restrictive. The consequence was massive ex-
traterritorial regulation, for the German regulation interrupted
l"As we shall see in Section III.E, nations can further regulate extraterritorial supply
through international harmonization.
.. See Nathaniel Nash, Holding Compuserve Responsible, NY Times D4 (Jan 15, 1996).
" See id.
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the flow and availability of the discussion groups for CompuServe
clients everywhere in the world.
The skeptics frequently recount this story to-show how uni-
lateral national regulation of cyberspace can have multijurisdic-
tional consequences."° But the rest of the story suggests a some-
what different lesson. After closing down transmission of the of-
fending discussions, CompuServe offered its German users soft-
ware that enabled them to block access to the offending discus-
sion groups.°'O The company then began to search for a more cen-
tralized way to filter the illegal newsgroups in Germany alone.
German prosecutors subsequently indicted a CompuServe execu-
tive, alleging that the company failed to implement such na-
tional-level filtering technology to prevent dissemination of other
illegal information in Germany.' °8 At about the same time, the
German parliament enacted a law clarifying that cyberspace ac-
cess providers are liable "if they are aware of the content" and fail
to use "technically possible and reasonable" means to block it.' °9
The subsequent events of the CompuServe controversy, like
the response to the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Commu-
nications Decency Act in Reno," ° make clear the growing impor-
tance of information discrimination technology to the cyberspace
regulation debate. Many jurisdictional challenges presented by
cyberspace result from the purported inability of content provid-
ers to prevent information flows from appearing simultaneously
in every jurisdiction. Thus far I have assumed, with the skeptics,
that this is a necessary (and accurate) feature of cyberspace ar-
chitecture. But it is not."' Cyberspace information can only ap-
'"See, for example, Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev.at 1373 & n 20 (cited in note 3).
"'See Edmund L. Andrews, Germany's Efforts to Police Web Are Upsetting Business,
NY Times Al (June 6, 1997).
" See id; Germany Brings Criminal Charges Against CompuServe Manager, Eu-
rowatch (May 2, 1997). The CompuServe executive was later convicted, even though at
trial's end the prosecution sought acquittal because it agreed with the defense that, at the
time of the indictment, CompuServe lacked the technological means to block the illegal
material. Battle of the Somm (May 29, 1998), available online at <www.wired.com/news/
newslpoliticslstory/12607.html> (visited Sept 10, 1998).
" Jordan Bonfante, The Internet Trials: Germany Makes an Early Attempt at Taming
the Wide, Wild Web. But Many are Crying Foul--or Folly, Time 30 (Intl ed July 14, 1997)
(emphasis added).
"'See ACLU White Paper, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? How Rating and
Blocking Proposals May Torch Free Speech on the Internet (1997), available online at
<www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html> (visited Apr 1, 1998) (warning of censorship
threats posed by rating and filtering proposals that flourished in wake of Reno); Lawrence
Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, Wired (July 1997), available online at
<www.wired.com/wired/5.07/cyber-rights.html> (visited Apr 1, 1998) (same).
.See Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, Wired (cited in note 110); Boyle, 66 U Cin
L Rev at 191-96 (cited in note 3).
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pear in a geographical jurisdiction by virtue of hardware and
software physically present in the jurisdiction. Available technol-
ogy already permits governments and private entities to regulate
the design and function of hardware and software to facilitate
discrimination of cyberspace information flows along a variety of
dimensions, including geography, network, and content."' This
technology is relatively new and still relatively crude, but it is
growing very quickly in both sophistication and effectiveness.
This technology facilitates discrimination and control of informa-
tion flows at any of several junctures along the cyberspace infor-
mation stream.
At the most basic level, the content provider can take steps to
control the flow of the information. This happens, for example,
whenever a web page operator conditions access to the page on
the users' presentation of information. Consider the many pre-
cautions taken by adult web pages. Some pages simply warn mi-
nors or persons from certain geographical locations not to view or
enter, and disclaim legal liability if they do."' Others condition
access on proof of age or on membership in one of dozens of pri-
"'In addition to the discussion below, see Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19
Hastings Comm/Enter L J 453 (1997); Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet,
Scientific Am 62-64 (Mar 1997); Reidenberg, 76 Tex L Rev at 556-68 (cited in note 60).
"'For example, Sexroulette.com includes the following conditions upon entry to its
pages:
WARNING: You are about to enter an ADULT ONLY area. You must agree to the
following terms before proceeding. If you are under the age of eighteen years...
you are not authorized to download any materials from XPICS and any and all such
downloading shall constitute intentional infringement of XPICS's rights in such ma-
terials.
All materials, messages, and other communications contained at XPICS are intended
for distribution exclusively to consenting adults in locations where such materials,
messages and other communications do not violate any community standards or any
federal, state or local law or regulation of the United States or any other country. No
materials from any parts of XPICS designated as "X are authorized to or other-
wise may be downloaded to persons located in the following areas: Alabama, Florida,
except Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, and St. Petersburg, Georgia, except Atlanta, Kansas,
except Kansas City, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Ohio, except Cleveland and Cincinnati, Pennsylvania, except Philadelphia and Pitts-
burgh, South Carolina, Tennessee, except for Nashville, Utah, Afghanistan, Kuwait,
Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Pakistan, The Republic of China, Singapore, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, The United Arab Emirates, or any other place in which to do so would
constitute a violation of any law, regulation, rule or custom. Any and all unauthor-
ized downloading of materials from XPICS shall constitute intentional infringement
of XPICS's rights in such materials.
If you agree with the above, you may ENTER. If you don't agree, you must EXIT.
<members.sexroulette.com> (visited Apr 1, 1998).
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vate age-verification services." 4 Others require potential end-
users to send by fax or telephone information specifying age and
geographical location.15 Still others label or rate their pages in
order to accommodate end-use filtering software, as described
below. Finally, digital identification technology developed for
Internet commerce provides a way to authenticate the identity of
a party in a cyberspace transaction."' Although digital identifica-
tion is usually used to verify who someone is, it can also be used
to verify other facts about cyberspace users, such as their nation-
ality, domicile, or permanent address.
At the other end of the distribution chain, end-users can em-
ploy software filters to block out or discriminate among informa-
tion flows."' Parental control software is the most prominent ex-
ample of an end-user filter, but many businesses and other local
area networks also employ these technologies. Content fiters also
can be imposed at junctures along the cyberspace information
stream between content providers and end-users. They can be
imposed, for example, at the network level or at the level of the
Internet service provider. They can also assist governments in fil-
tering information at the national level."' A government can
choose to have no Internet links whatsoever and to regulate tele-
"'See, for example, The Adult Check System, <www.adultcheck.com> (visited Sept 10,
1998).
"'In many of the well-known cyberspace regulation cases, the defendants knew that
they were sending content into the regulating jurisdiction because they had conditioned
the users' request for the content on the presentation of information (including geographi-
cal identification) by fax or mail. See, for example, Thomas, 74 F3d at 705; Playboy Enter-
prises, Inc v Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc, 939 F Supp 1032, 1035 (S D NY 1996); State v
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc, 1996 WL 767431, *4 (Minn Dist Ct), affd, 568 NW2d 715 (Minn
App 1997).
"'See generally Introduction to Client Digital ID'sSM, available online at
<www.verisign.com/repository/brwidint.htm> (visited Apr 1, 1998); A. Michael Froomkin,
The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties In Electronic Commerce, 75 Or L Rev 49, 55-
60(1996).
". First generation software filters blocked access to individually compiled lists of pro-
hibited Internet addresses. See Weinberg, 19 Hastings Comm/Enter L J at 457 (cited in
note 112). More recently, a much more sophisticated industry-wide standard for labeling,
rating, and filtering Internet information has emerged. This standard, known as PICS, es-
tablishes content-neutral labeling formats and distribution methods. The PICS format
does not specify a labeling vocabulary or what should be done with the labels. Instead, the
PICS format allows both content providers and independent entities to label content along
several dimensions. Selection software then decides what to do with these labels-whether
to block them, restrict access, highlight them, organize them in certain ways, or whatever
else the software is designed for.
"'See Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the Interna-
tional System, 10 Harv J L & Tech 647, 649-56 (1997); Delacourt, 38 Harv J Intl L at 208-
19 (cited in note 3); Paul Resnick, PICS, Censorship, & Intellectual Freedom FAQ, version
1.14, available online at <www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/pics/intfree/faq.htm> (visited Apr
1, 1998).
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phone and other communication lines to access providers in other
countries.'19 China, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates
have taken the somewhat less severe steps of (i) regulating access
to the Net through centralized filtered servers, and (ii) requiring
filters for in-state Internet service providers and end-users.2 0 We
have seen that Germany has chosen to hold liable Internet access
providers who have knowledge of illegal content and fail to use
"technically possible and reasonable" means to filter it. 2' The
Federal Communications Commission recently required V-chip
blocking technology to be placed in computers capable of receiv-
ing video broadcasting,'22 and pending anti-spain legislation
would impose identification requirements on commercial e-mail
senders and filtering requirements on Internet service provid-
ers." There are numerous other possibilities."
Although technological predictions are precarious, it seems
likely that the techniques and technologies for controlling cyber-
space information flows will continue to develop in scope and so-
phistication, and will play an important role in resolving the ju-
risdictional quandaries presented by the "borderless" medium. In-
formation is not particularly useful unless people can organize,
select, and block it." This is one reason why information filtering
is an essential component of all communications media.'26 Filter-
ing is especially important for cyberspace, where the costs of in-
formation production and dissemination are extremely low, and
thus information overload is a serious concern. Indeed, the explo-
sive growth of the World Wide Web is directly attributable to the
"'See Wu, Note, 10 Harv J L & Tech at 651 (cited in note 118) ("As of July 1996, at
least thirty-three states were completely unconnected.").
'"See id at 652-54 (China, Singapore); Madanmohan Rao, Persian Gulf Net Censor-
ship: Governments Force Server Blockades (Oct 3, 1997), available online at <media
info.elpress.com/ephomelnews/newshtm/webnews/globl003.htm> (visited Apr 1, 1998)
(United Arab Emirates).
"'See text accompanying notes 104-09.
'"See Christopher Stern, V-chip on fast track as FCC ok's tech spex, Variety 27 (Mar
16-22, 1998); Brooks Boliek, Television sharpens bite: V-chip wins FCC approval, Holly-
wood Reporter 15 (Mar 13, 1998).
'See Clausing, Compressed Data, NY Times D3 (cited in note 99).
Many predict that Congress will more broadly require filtering or digital identifica-
tion technology to be built into the architecture of cyberspace. See Boyle, 66 U Cin L Rev
at 193, 202-04 (cited in note 3); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0
vs. Filtering, 38 Jurimetrics J 629 (forthcoming 1998). Even in the absence of direct gov-
ernmental mandates, the threat of such regulation has already spurred the development
and adoption of an array of private de facto Internet discrimination standards that facili-
tate extensive private regulation of the Net.
'"See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regu-
lation, 45 Duke L J 1131, 1141-44 (1996) (describing the filtering of information in print
and broadcast media).
'2 Id at 1143.
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invention of identification and filtering technologies that made it
possible to organize and select from the morass of available in-
formation. 27
An additional reason that techniques for controlling cyber-
space information flows are likely to be at least moderately suc-
cessful is that so many participants in the cyberspace regulation
debate-parents, businesses, content suppliers, service providers,
governments, and even some anticensorship civil libertarians s-
desire such control. As Resnick has pointed out, "meta-data sys-
tems.., are going to be an important part of the Web, because
they enable more sophisticated commerce . . . , communication,
indexing, and searching services."'29 Many jurisdictions have al-
ready mandated the use of filtering and identification mecha-
nisms. 30 Even in the absence of government mandates, content
filtering and digital identification technologies have flourished for
commerical reasons and in response to the threat of regulation,
and have become de facto standards in many cyberspace contexts.
Many commentators are skeptical about these filtering and
identification technologies.'' They argue that content filters in-
variably both over- and under-filter; that identification technolo-
gies sometimes misidentify; and that some hackers will access
prohibited information. These worries are to some degree well-
founded. What is not well-founded, however, is the belief that im-
perfect regulation means ineffective regulation."2 Real space is
filled with similarly imperfect filtering and identification tech-
niques: criminals crack safes and escape from jail, fifteen year
olds visit bars with fake iDs, secret information is leaked to the
press, and so on. In cyberspace as in real space, imperfections in
filtering and identification regimes do not render the regimes in-
effective. 3 Although the ultimate accuracy of cyberspace filtering
"See Robert H. Reid, Architects of the Web: 1000 Days that Built the Future of Busi-
ness xxiii-xxiv (Wiley 1997).
"Some civil libertarians favor information filtering technologies because they allow
individuals--rather than the government-to decide what information is appropriate for
their own (or their children's) consumption. See, for example, Brief of Feminists for Free
Expression as Amicus Curiae in support of Appellees, Reno v ACLU, 117 S Ct 2329 (1997),
available at 1997 WL 74382, *15-16.
"=Resnick, PICS, Censorship & Intellectual Freedom at 3 (cited in note 118).
See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1373-74 & n 20 (cited in note 3); notes 122-
24 and accompanying text.
... See, for example, Weinberg, 19 Hastings Comm/Enter L J at 459-70 (cited in note
112); Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1373-74 (cited in note 3); Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center, Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block Access to Kid-Friendly Infor-
motion on the Internet, available online at <www2.epic.org/reports/filter..report.htm>
(visited Apr 1, 1998).
"See, for example, Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1372-74 (cited in note 3).
" See note 102 and accompanying text.
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and identification technologies remains an open question, there is
little doubt that such technologies will contribute significantly to
cyberspace regulation by enabling governments, content provid-
ers, end-users, and service providers to raise significantly the cost
of accessing certain information. Indeed, this has already hap-
pened throughout cyberspace, where content filtering, condi-
tioned access, and identification codes are pervasive.
The ability to control information flows alleviates the many
cyberspace regulation problems that are premised on the as-
sumption that information in cyberspace appears simultaneously
in every jurisdiction. To see why, consider one set of differences
between a newspaper publisher and a cyberspace content pro-
vider. It is relatively uncontroversial that a newspaper publisher
is liable for harms caused wherever the newspaper is published
or distributed. This seems appropriate because, among other rea-
sons, we think the publisher can control the geographical locus of
publication and distribution. Requiring such control imposes
modest costs on the publisher; she must, for example, keep
abreast of regulatory developments in different jurisdictions and
take steps to exclude publication and distribution in places where
she wants to avoid liability.
Now consider the cyberspace content provider. Many have an
intuition that such content providers should not be liable for
harms caused wherever the content appears."3 The primary basis
for this intuition is that the content provider cannot control the
geographical and network distribution of his information flows.
But this latter point is groundless. Content providers already
have several means to control information flows." 5 As the cost of
such control continues to drop, and the accuracy and ease of this
control increases, cyberspace content providers will come to oc-
cupy the same position as the newspaper publisher. It will thus
be appropriate in cyberspace, as in real space, for the law to im-
pose small costs on both types of publisher to ensure that content
does not appear in jurisdictions and networks where it is illegal.
E. International Harmonization
Private legal ordering, the limitations on enforcement juris-
diction, indirect regulation, and effective information flow control,
taken together, go a long way toward redressing the skeptics' de-
scriptive claims about the infeasibility of cyberspace regulation.
These techniques will not resolve all conflict of laws in cyberspace
"See, for example, Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1375-76 (cited in note 3).
"See notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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any more than they do in real space. Nor will they definitively re-
solve the problem of the relative ease by which information sup-
pliers can "relocate" into a safe haven outside of the regulating
jurisdiction, a problem that also has many real-space analogies.13 6
When similar spillover and evasion problems have occurred with
respect to non-cyberspace transactions, nations have responded
with a variety of international harmonization strategies.
The same harmonization strategies are being used today to
address the challenges presented by cyberspace transactions. A
few examples will suffice. Several recent treaties and related
multinational edicts have strengthened digital content owners'
right to control the distribution and presentation of their prop-
erty online.137 These harmonization efforts grow out of an interna-
tional copyright regime that is over one hundred years old. 3 ' The
G8 economic powers have recently begun to coordinate regulatory
efforts concerning cyberspace-related crimes in five areas: pedo-
philia and sexual exploitation; drug-trafficking; money-
laundering; electronic fraud; and industrial and state espio-
nage.'39 These initiatives mirror similar efforts to redress similar
regulatory leakage problems in real-space contexts such as envi-
ronmental policy, banking and insurance supervision, and anti-
trust regulation.'4 ° Several international organizations have
drafted model laws and guidelines to facilitate Internet commerce
and related digital certification issues.' There are scores of other
international efforts in a variety of cyberspace-related contexts.
"See discussion in Section II.
"In December 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") reached
agreement on a treaty that significantly extended international copyright protection for
digital property. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dee 20, 1996, WIPO Pub No 226(E)
(WIPO 1997); Seth Schiesel, Global Agreement Reached to Widen Law on Copyright, NY
Times 1 (Dee 21, 1996). Within a year, the European Commission issued a draft directive
to bring European law into line with these international obligations. See Draft EC Direc-
tive Provides Strong Online Copyright Protection, Outlaws Devices Facilitating Infringe-
ment, BNA Electronic Commerce and L Rep (Mar 13, 1998), available online at
<www.bna.com/e-law/main.htm> (visited Apr 1, 1998). The United States is in the process
of enacting similar legislation. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, HR
2281, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (July 29, 1997); Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998,
S 2037, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (May 6, 1998).
"The digital protection treaty signed in Geneva operates as a protocol to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, a treaty regime that began
in 1886. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (WIPO
1970).
"See Clifford Krauss, 8 Countries Join in an Effort To Catch Computer Criminals,
NY Times A12 (Dec 11, 1997).
"eSee Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Foreign Affairs 183, 189-92
(Sep/Oct 1997).
' For example, in February 1997, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") began to draft model international digital signature legislation.
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International harmonization is not always (or even usually)
the best response to the spillovers and evasions that result from
unilateral regulation.12 And harmonization is often not easy to
achieve. However, the proliferation of international organiza-
tions, in combination with modern means of communication and
transportation, has helped to facilitate international harmoniza-
tion. Harmonization is especially likely in those contexts-like
many aspects of criminal law enforcement-where nations' inter-
ests converge and the gains from cooperation are high. But na-
tions sometimes lack the incentive to participate in international
regimes, and there are often international and domestic political
economy obstacles to harmonization.' It is too early to tell how
successful international efforts will be in addressing the chal-
lenges of cyberspace. It is clear, however, that international har-
monization will play an important role in nations' overall cyber-
space-regulation strategy.
F. Residual Choice-of-Law Tools
The skeptics' implicit goal of eliminating all conflicts of laws
that arise from cyberspace transactions is unrealistic. Private le-
gal ordering, the limits of enforcement jurisdiction, indirect
regulation of extraterritorial activity, filtering and identification
technology, and international cooperation facilitate and rational-
ize legal regulation of cyberspace. These tools, however, will not
eliminate all conflicts of laws in cyberspace any more than they
do in real space. Transnational activity is too complex. As men-
tioned above, the elimination of conflict of laws would require the
elimination of decentralized lawmaking or of transnational activ-
ity.' In this light, the enormous increases in the pervasiveness
and complexity of conflict of laws in this century can be viewed as
See Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Thirty-First Session (New York,
Feb 12-28, 1997). See also UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Planning
Of Future Work on Electronic Commerce: Digital Signatures, Certification Authorities and
Related Legal Issues A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.71 (Dec 31, 1996). Similarly, in November 1997,
the International Chamber of Commerce issued the General Usage for International Digi-
tally Ensured Commerce ("GUIDEC"), a set of guidelines for ensuring trustworthy digital
transactions over the Internet, available online at <www.iccwbo.org/guidec2/htm> (visited
Apr 5, 1998). And the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
recently adopted principles to guide countries in formulating their own policies and legis-
lation relating to the use of cryptography. See OECD Cryptography Policy: The Guidelines
and the Issues, Unclassified OCDE/GD(97)204 (1997), available online at <www.oecd.org/
dstilstiit/secur/prodGD97-204.htmn> (visited Apr 2, 1998).
,2 See Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes (cited in note 59).
"See, for example, Krasner, 43 World Pol at 337-60 (cited in note 96); Andrew T.
Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 NYU L Rev (forthcoming 1998).
'" See text accompanying notes 58-59.
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an acceptable cost to a world that wishes to expand transnational
activity while retaining decentralized lawmaking. As persistent
conflicts become prohibitively costly to private parties and regu-
lating nations, public or private international coordination or
technological innovation becomes more attractive and thus more
likely.
Short of these developments, transnational transactions in
cyberspace, like transnational transactions mediated by tele-
phone and mail, will continue to give rise to disputes that present
challenging choice-of-law issues. For example: "Whose substan-
tive legal rules apply to a defamatory message that is written by
someone in Mexico, read by someone in Israel by means of an
Internet server located in the United States, injuring the reputa-
tion of a Norwegian?"145 Similarly,
[w]hich of the many plausibly applicable bodies of copyright
law do we consult to determine whether a hyperlink on a
World Wide Web page located on a server in France and con-
structed by a Filipino citizen, which points to a server in
Brazil that contains materials protected by German and
French (but not Brazilian) copyright law, which is down-
loaded to a server in the United States and reposted to a
Usenet newsgroup, constitutes a remediable infringement of
copyright?1
46
It would be silly to try to formulate a general theory of how
such issues should be resolved. One lesson of this century's many
failures in top-down choice-of-law theorizing is that choice-of-law
rules are most effective when they are grounded in and sensitive
to the concrete details of particular legal contexts. This does not
mean that standards are better than rules in this context. It sim-
ply means that in designing choice-of-law rules or standards, it is
better to begin at the micro rather than macro level, and to ex-
amine recurrent fact patterns and implicated interests in discrete
legal contexts rather than devise a general context-transcendent
theory of conflicts. 47
With these caveats in mind, I want to explain in very general
terms why the residual choice-of-law problems implicated by cy-
"
5 Perritt, 41 Vill L Rev at 3 (cited in note 78).
"'4Post and Johnson, Borders, Spillovers, and Complexity at 2-3 (cited in note 3).
"'Many European conflict systems demonstrate that it is both possible and useful to
design choice-of-law rules that are context-sensitive and not beholden to any grand choice-
of-law theory. See, for example, Swiss Private International Law Statute of December 18,
1987, translated in Andreas Bucher and Pierre-Yves Tschanz, International Arbitration in
Switzerland 225 (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1988).
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berspace are not significantly different from those that are non-
cyberspace conflicts. Cyberspace presents two related choice-of-
law problems. The first is the problem of complexity. This is the
problem of how to choose a single governing law for cyberspace
activity that has multijurisdictional contacts. The second problem
concerns situs. This is the problem of how to choose a governing
law when the locus of activity cannot easily be pinpointed in geo-
graphical space. Both problems raise similar concerns. The choice
of any dispositive geographical contact or any particular law in
these cases will often seem arbitrary because several jurisdictions
have a legitimate claim to apply their law. Whatever law is cho-
sen, seemingly genuine regulatory interests of the nations whose
laws are not applied may be impaired.
The problems of complexity and situs are genuine. They are
not, however, unique to cyberspace. Identical problems arise all
the time in real space. In fact, they inhere in every true conflict of
laws. Consider the problem of complexity. The hypotheticals con-
cerning copyright infringements and multistate libels in cyber-
space are no more complex than the same issues in real space. 48
They also are no more complex or challenging than similar issues
presented by increasingly prevalent real-space events such as
airplane crashes, mass torts, multistate insurance coverage, or
multinational commercial transactions, all of which form the
bread and butter of modern conflict of laws.' Indeed, they are no
more complex than a simple products liability suit arising from a
two-car accident among residents of the same state, which can
implicate the laws of several states, including the place of the ac-
cident, the states where the car and tire manufacturers are head-
quartered, the states where the car and tires were manufactured,
and the state where the car was purchased.'
Resolution of choice-of-law problems in these contexts is
challenging. But the skeptics overstate the challenge. Not every
geographical contact is of equal significance. For example, in the
copyright hypothetical above, the laws of the source country and
the end-use countries have a much greater claim to governing the
copyright action than the laws of the country of the person who
" See London Film Productions v Intercontinental Communications, Inc, 580 F Supp
47, 48-49 (S D NY 1984) (involving a British corporation suing an American corporation
for copyright infringement in Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Equador, Costa Rica, and Panama);
Eugene F. Scoles and Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 631 (West 2d ed 1992) (describing
choice-of-law rules for multistate libel).
"'See generally Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 NYU L Rev
547, 551-65 (1996).
"See, for example, Rutherford v Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co, 943 F Supp 789, 790-
91 (W D Ky 1996), affd, 142 F3d 436 (6th Cir 1998).
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built the server and the country of the server whose hyperlink
pointed to the server that contained the infringing material.'51
The limits on enforcement jurisdiction may further minimize the
scope of the conflict.15 2 In addition, even in extraordinarily com-
plex cases where numerous laws potentially apply, these laws
will often involve similar legal standards, thus limiting the actual
choice of law to two or perhaps three options."53 Finally, these
complex transactions need not be governed by a single law. Ap-
plying different laws to different aspects of a complex transaction
is a perfectly legitimate choice-of-law technique."5
The application of a single law to complex multijurisdictional
conflicts will sometimes seem arbitrary and will invariably pro-
duce spillover effects. But as explained above, the arbitrariness of
the chosen law, and the spillovers produced by application of this
law, inhere in all conflict situations in which two or more nations,
on the basis of territorial or domiciliary contacts, have a legiti-
mate claim to apply their law. When in particular contexts the
arbitrariness and spillovers become too severe, a uniform inter-
national solution remains possible. Short of such harmonization,
the choice-of-law issues implicated by cyberspace transactions are
no more complex than the issues raised by functionally identical
multijurisdictional transactions that occur in real space all the
time.
Like the problem of complexity, the situs problem is a perva-
sive and familiar feature of real-space jurisdictional conflicts. A
classic difficulty is the situs of intangibles like a debt or a bank
deposit.'55 More generally, the situs problem arises whenever le-
gally significant activity touches on two or more states. For ex-
ample, when adultery committed in one state alienates the affec-
tions of a spouse in another, the situs of the tort is not self-
evident. It depends on what contact the forum's choice-of-law rule
deems dispositive. Similar locus difficulties arise when the tort
takes place over many states, such as when poison is adminis-
"' For an excellent analysis of how traditional choice-of-law rules might apply to copy-
right violations in cyberspace, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders?: Choice
of Forum and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 Cardozo Arts &
Enter L J 153, 168-74 (1997).
2See Section III.B.
"See Kramer, 71 NYU L Rev at 583 (cited in note 149).
"UThis is known as "depecage." See Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws at 366 (cited in note
32).
" See Peter S. Smedresman and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational
Banks, and National Laws, 64 NYU L Rev 733, 734-37 (1989) (discussing the bank deposit
problem); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v.
Heitner, 53 NYU L Rev 102, 115-17, 122-24 (1978) (exploring situs of debt problem largely
in context of personal jurisdiction).
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tered in one state, takes effect in another, and kills in a third.
The situs problem even arises when a bodily injury occurs in one
state based on negligence committed in another, for there is no
logical reason why the place of injury should be viewed as the
place of the tort any more than should the place of negligence.'56
In all of these situations, the importance of any particular geo-
graphical contact is never self-evident; it is .a legal rather than a
factual consideration that is built into the forum's choice-of-law
rules. As the geographical contacts of a transaction proliferate,
the choice of any one contact as dispositive runs the risk of ap-
pearing arbitrary. But again, this problem pervades real-space
conflicts of law and is not unique to cyberspace conflicts.
So the complexity and situs problems inhere to some degree
in all transnational conflicts, and are exacerbated in real space
and cyberspace alike as jurisdictional contacts proliferate. No
choice-of-law rule will prove wholly satisfactory in these situa-
tions. However, several factors diminish the skeptics' concerns
about the infeasibility of applying traditional choice-of-law tools
to cyberspace. For example, the skeptics are wrong to the extent
that they believe that cyberspace transactions must be resolved
on the basis of geographical choice-of-law criteria that are some-
times difficult to apply to cyberspace, such as where events occur
or where people are located at the time of the transaction. But
these are not the only choice-of-law criteria, and certainly not the
best in contexts where the geographical locus of events is so un-
clear. Domicile (and its cognates, such as citizenship, principal
place of business, habitual residence, and so on) are also valid
choice-of-law criteria that have particular relevance to problems,
like those in cyberspace, that involve the regulation of intangibles
or of multinational transactions.
The skeptics are further mistaken to the extent that their
arguments assume that all choice-of-law problems must be re-
solved by multilateral choice-of-law methodologies. A multilateral
methodology asks which of several possible laws governs a trans-
action, and selects one of these laws on the basis of specified cri-
teria. Multilateral methods accentuate the situs and complexity
problems. But the regulatory issues that are most relevant to the
cyberspace governance debate almost always involve unilateral
- See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law,
1991 S Ct Rev 179, 190 n 36. A similar problem is presented by multistate contracts.
When contractual negotiations and signings take place in two states, the place of the con-
tract might be either state, depending on what contact the forum's choice-of-law rule
deems dispositive for this purpose.
1236 [65:1199
HeinOnline  -- 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1236 1998
Against Cyberanarchy
choice-of-law methods that alleviate these problems.15 7 A unilat-
eral method considers only whether the dispute at issue has close
enough connections to the forum to justify the application of local
law." If so, local law applies; if not, the case is dismissed and the
potential applicability of foreign law is not considered. For exam-
ple, a jurisdiction typically does not apply foreign criminal law. If
a Tennessee court has personal jurisdiction over someone from
across the Virginia border who shot and killed an in-stater, the
court does not consider whether Tennessee or Virginia law ap-
plies. It considers only whether Tennessee law applies. If so, the
case proceeds; if not, it is dismissed. 9
Unilateral choice-of-law methods make the complexity and
situs problems less significant. They do not require a determina-
tion of which of a number of possible laws apply. Nor do they re-
quire a court to identify where certain events occurred. What
matters is simply whether the activity has local effects that are
significant enough to implicate local law. By failing to recognize
that courts can and will use unilateral rather than multilateral
choice-of-law methods to resolve cyberspace conflicts, the skeptics
again exaggerate the challenge of cyberspace regulation.
G. Number and Velocity of Transactions
The skeptics' final descriptive claim is that even if cyberspace
transactions appear like real-space transnational transactions in
other respects, they differ significantly with respect to the veloc-
ity and number of transactions."s Cyberspace dramatically lowers
the costs of multinational communication. With only a computer
and Internet access, anyone in the world can communicate with
anyone, and potentially everyone, in the world. The skeptics be-
lieve communications via cyberspace will be so prevalent that
governments will not find it cost-effective to regulate them.1'
A dramatic increase in the number and speed of transactions
might well multiply the aggregate harms from such transactions.
But this increases rather than decreases a nation's incentives to
regulate. Consider Internet gambling. In pre-Internet days, indi-
" See Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness at 5 (cited
in note 48).
"See Dodge, 39 Harv Intl L J at 108-10 (cited in note 36).
"The same analysis applies in the international context for the extraterritorial appli-
cation of other regulatory laws like RICO and the antitrust and securities laws. The ques-
tion in these cases is whether Congress intended for federal law to apply to conduct
abroad. If so, these laws apply. If not, the court dismisses the case without considering the
application of foreign law.
'See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1372-73 (cited in note 3).
"' See id.
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viduals in the United States could gamble from home or work via
telephone with domestic and offshore bookies. Although this form
of gambling was regulated by a variety of state and federal stat-
utes, the statutes were filled with loopholes and rarely enforced
because transactions were relatively infrequent. 62 Internet gam-
bling makes it significantly easier to gamble from home or work.
This has led to a dramatic increase in gambling and a related rise
in the costs of gambling that governments worry about: fraud,
diminution in local gambling and other entertainment expendi-
tures, loss of tax revenues, decreased productivity, gambling by
children, and so on. Not surprisingly, federal and state govern-
ments are beginning to regulate gambling much more exten-
sively, and seriously, than ever."
Even with governments' heightened incentives to regulate
Internet transactions, some believe that the sheer number of
transactions will overwhelm governments' ability to regulate. A
related argument is that because individuals can so easily engage
in transnational communications via the Internet, governmental
regulation will be less effective; for individuals operating on the
Internet are hard to identify, isolate, and thus sanction. Once
again, the conclusion that regulation is infeasible simply does not
follow from these premises. The mistake here is the belief that
governments regulate only through direct sanctioning of indi-
viduals. But of course this is not the only way, or even the usual
way, that regulation works. Governments regulate an activity by
raising the activity's costs in a manner that achieves desired
ends. This can be accomplished through several means other than
individual sanctions. Governments can, for example, try to alter
the social meaning of the activity, regulate the hardware and
software through which the activity takes place, make individual
penalties severe and notorious, or impose liability on intermedi-
aries like Internet service providers or credit card companies.
In short, a dramatic increase in the number and velocity of
transactions by itself says very little about the feasibility of gov-
ernmental regulation. Numerous communication advances, be-ginning with the telegraph, dramatically increased the velocity
and number of communications, and lowered their costs. The
"See Britta Gordon, ,Gaming on the Internet: The Odds are on the House, But How
Long Will it Last? 5, available online at <www.cyberlaw.law.ttu.edu/cyberspc/jour9.htm>
(visited Apr 1, 1998).
"'There is currently legislation pending in Congress that would extensively regulate
Internet gambling by, among other things, penalizing online bettors and authorizing gov-
ernmental officials to order Internet service providers to shut down offending online cites.
See note 98.
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skeptics have provided no reason to think that the differences be-
tween cyberspace and prior communication technology are so
much greater than the differences between pre- and post-
telegraph technology (which reduced communication time from
weeks and months to hours and minutes), or between pre- and
post-telephone technology (which also dramatically reduced the
cost and enhanced the frequency and privacy of transjurisdic-
tional communication) to justify the conclusion that governmen-
tal regulation will be nonefficacious.
IV. IS CYBERSPACE REGULATION LEGITIMATE?
Section III explored some of the many ways that nations
might regulate cyberspace transactions. This Section considers
the skeptics' normative claim that such regulation is illegitimate.
This claim is directed primarily to the application of mandatory
laws. The skeptics argue that cyberspace should be self-
regulated, and that national mandatory laws should not limit
these private legal orders. This argument subsumes three closely
related claims: (i) unilateral regulation of cyberspace is extrater-
ritorial; (ii) unilateral regulation of cyberspace produces signifi-
cant spillover effects; and (iii) the structure of cyberspace makes
effective notice of territorial regulation impossible. I address each
claim in turn.
A. Extraterritoriality
In the Digitalbook.com example above, Singapore and Eng-
land regulated the local effects of Digitalbook.com's activities in
the United States.'" In the CompuServe example, Germany
regulated transmission flows from other countries." These are
the types of extraterritorial regulation that worry the skeptics.
But such extraterritorial regulation is commonplace in the mod-
em world. As we saw above, it is settled with respect to real-
space activity that a nation's right to control events within its
territory and to protect its citizens permits it to regulate the local
effects of extraterritorial acts."
The same rationale applies to cyberspace because cyberspace
is for these purposes no different than real space. Transactions in
cyberspace involve real people in one territorial jurisdiction ei-
ther (i) transacting with real people in other territorial jurisdic-
tions or (ii) engaging in activity in one jurisdiction that causes
'" See text following note 23.
'"See text accompanying notes 104-09.
'" See notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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real-world effects in another territorial jurisdiction. To this ex-
tent, activity in cyberspace is functionally identical to transna-
tional activity mediated by other means, such as mail or tele-
phone or smoke signal. The new medium of communication is
richer, more complex, and much more efficient. But in terms of
real-space acts in one jurisdiction that produce real-space effects
in another, it is no different from other forms of transnational
transaction and communication. And the justification for and le-
gitimacy of regulating local effects is no different. Under current
conceptions of territorial sovereignty, a jurisdiction is allowed to
regulate extraterritorial acts that cause harmful local effects un-
less and until it has consented to a higher law (for example, in-
ternational law or constitutional law) that specifies otherwise.
B. Spillover Effects
The skeptics argue that unilateral extraterritorial regulation
of cyberspace differs from similar regulation of real-space activi-
ties because of the regulation's spillover effects in other jurisdic-
tions. These effects are inevitable, they think, because informa-
tion flows in cyberspace appear simultaneously in all territorial
jurisdictions. As a result, unilateral territorial regulation of the
local effects of cyberspace transmission flows will sometimes af-
fect the flow and regulation of web information in other countries.
This is especially true when the regulation is directed at a mul-
tijurisdictional access provider, as was the case with Germany's
regulation of CompuServe.
Section III described how technology and international coop-
eration can diminish these spillover effects. But even without
these mitigating factors, there is nothing extraordinary or ille-
gitimate about unilateral regulation of transnational activity that
affects activity and regulation in other countries. Germany's
regulation of CompuServe is no less legitimate than the United
States' regulation of the competitiveness of the English reinsur-
ance market, which has worldwide effects on the availability and
price of reinsurance. 67 Nor is it any different in this regard from
national regulation of transborder pollution, or from national
consumer protection regulation of transnational contracts, or
from national criminal prohibitions on transnational drug activi-
ties, all of which produce spillovers. In many contexts, there are
powerful reasons for nations to surrender their regulatory pre-
rogatives in order to reduce spillover and other costs. But at least
See Hartford Fire Insurance Co, 509 US at 795-99.
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under our current conceptions of territorial sovereignty, such re-
forms must proceed by national consent. The need for such con-
sent begins from the premise that in its absence, national regula-
tion of local effects is a legitimate incident of sovereignty, even if
such regulation produces spillover effects.
Germany's regulation of CompuServe is not just a legitimate
incident of territorial sovereignty. It is also fair to CompuServe
under a straightforward reciprocal benefits rationale. Compu-
Serve reaps financial and other benefits from its presence in
Germany.1" Without this presence, German enforcement threats
would be largely empty. CompuServe need not remain in Ger-
many; it could close its shop there. Its decision to stay in Ger-
many and comply with German regulations might increase the
price of its services in Germany and elsewhere. For CompuServe
this is a cost of doing business via a new communication medium.
The desire to reduce this and related costs is driving the devel-
opment of technology that permits geographical and other forms
of discrimination on the Internet.'69 But even in the absence of
such technologies, Germany's local regulation of CompuServe re-
mains within traditional reciprocity-based justifications for
regulating local effects.
What about CompuServe users in other countries who are af-
fected by the German regulation? It is hard to see how the Ger-
man regulation unfairly burdens them. They remain free to
choose among dozens of Internet access services that are not af-
fected by the German regulation. Consider further the German
perspective. Germany bans certain forms of pornography within
its borders. If the medium of this pornography were paper, there
would be no fairness-based jurisdictional objection to a German
prohibition on the pornography's entry at the border or to Ger-
man punishment of those who are later discovered to have smug-
gled it in.' From Germany's perspective, it makes no difference
whether the pornography enters the nation via cyberspace or the
postal service. The rationale for the regulation is the same in
both cases: something is happening within Germany that impli-
cates the government's paternalistic concerns or that harms third
parties within its borders. The fact that the local regulation
might affect the cost or availability of pornography in other coun-
"SIn late 1996, CompuServe had 335,000 German subscribers and employed over 250
workers there. Compuserve May Curb German Operations, NY Times D6 (Nov 19, 1996).
See Section III.D.
1"0There might of course be substantive objections akin to the First Amendment found
either in German law or in international human rights law. As I mentioned at the outset,
such substantive limitations on cyberspace regulation are not my concern here.
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tries is, from this perspective, irrelevant. Fairness does not re-
quire Germany to yield local control over its territory in order to
accommodate the users of a new communication technology in
other countries. Nor does it require Germany to absorb the local
costs of foreign activity because of the costs that the German
regulation might impose on such activity.
This latter point sheds light on one of the major fallacies of
the skeptics' normative project. The skeptics argue that the spill-
over effects caused by territorial regulation of cyberspace justify
cyberspace self-regulation. Spillover-minimization is not the cri-
terion of legitimacy for national regulation of harmful local ef-
fects. 7' But even if it were, the skeptics' conclusions would not
follow. For the skeptics completely ignore the spillover effects of
cyberspace activity itself. They do not consider these effects be-
cause they take it as an article of faith that cyberspace partici-
pants form a self-contained group that can internalize the costs of
its activity. 2 But this assumption is false. Cyberspace partici-
pants are no more self-contained than telephone users, members
of the Catholic Church, corporations, and other private groups
with activities that transcend jurisdictional borders. They are
real people in real space transacting in a fashion that produces
real-world effects on cyberspace participants and nonparticipants
alike. Cyberspace users solicit and deliver kiddie porn, launder
money, sexually harass, defraud, and so on. It is these and many
other real-space costs--costs that cyberspace communities cannot
effectively internalize-that national regulatory regimes worry
about and aim to regulate.
So the spillover argument runs in both directions. Cyber-
space activity outside of Germany produces spillovers in Ger-
many, and German regulation produces spillovers on cyberspace
activity beyond its borders. The legitimacy and fairness of Ger-
many's territorial regulation does not depend on minimization of
these costs. But even if it did, the skeptics' desired normative
conclusion that cyberspace should be self-regulated would only
follow if the costs of cyberspace self-regulation were less signifi-
cant than the costs of territorial regulation. The skeptics have not
begun to try to demonstrate that this is true. And any such at-
tempt is very unlikely to succeed at the level of generality at
which their arguments are invariably pitched.
... See discussion in Section II.
"See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1378-91 (cited in note 3).
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C. Notice
The skeptics' final normative argument against mandatory
law regulation of cyberspace concerns notice. In real space, par-
ties can direct the flow of their transnational transactions and
can in most cases avoid jurisdictions that prohibit the transac-
tions. The skeptics claim that this cannot be done in cyberspace.
They worry that cyberspace participants therefore lack notice
about governing mandatory law and hence cannot conform their
behavior to it. The skeptics claim this lack of notice violates basic
norms of fairness.
This argument rests on a number of empirical assumptions
that have been questioned in Section m. The assumption that
cyberspace involves uncontrollable universal information flows is
inaccurate today and will become even less accurate with time.
Information flows can be directed and controlled in a variety of
ways, with varying costs that will almost certainly decrease in
the future.' Concerns about notice are further attenuated by the
many limitations on enforcement jurisdiction that effectively
limit the application of mandatory laws to entities with a local
presence.' 4 In none of the many cases in which regulations have
been enforced against cyberspace transactions has an out-of-state
defendant had a basis to claim unfair surprise.
It is nonetheless worth considering how the notice issue will
play out in cyberspace. The Constitution and international law
impose weak notice requirements on the application of local law
to extraterritorial conduct. The Constitution permits a state with
significant contacts to the case to apply its law if the defendant
could have reasonably foreseen its application.' International
law might impose a similar restraint on legislative jurisdiction.
This requirement of reasonable foreseeability does not mean
that harmful local effects of extraterritorial activity are auto-
matically immune from local regulation just because they were
accidental, or because the agent of the activity did not know the
precise locus of the effects. "Reasonable foreseeability" is a dy-
"See Section III.D.
"'See Section III.B.
"I glean this formulation from Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 807
(1985); Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion); Clay
v Sun Insurance Office, Ltd, 377 US 179, 182 (1964); Watson v Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corp, 348 US 66, 72-73 (1954); and Home Insurance Co v Dick, 281 US 397, 410
(1930). Like all formulations of constitutional limitations on choice of law, this one is open
to debate because the Court's analysis in these decisions is maddeningly vague, and be-
cause the Court has mixed due process and full faith and credit concerns. See note 34 and
accompanying text. But at the very least, the formulation in the text is close enough to the
constitutional requirement of notice to consider the application of this test to cyberspace.
1998] 1243
HeinOnline  -- 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1243 1998
The University of Chicago Law Review
namic concept. A manufacturer that pollutes in one state is not
immune from the antipollution laws of other states where the
pollution causes harm just because it cannot predict which way
the wind blows. Similarly, a cyberspace content provider cannot
necessarily claim ignorance about the geographical flow of infor-
mation as a defense to the application of the law of the place
where the information appears. At first glance it appears unfair
to expose Digitalbook.com to the antipornography laws of Singa-
pore. But it would not seem unfair if Digitalbook.com could at a
small cost prevent its information from entering Singapore. Nor
would it seem unfair to expose Digitalbook.com to liability for the
damage caused in Singapore by a virus that it released into cy-
berspace that destroyed every Apple computer hard drive con-
nected to the Internet.
These intuitions show that, like the related personal jurisdic-
tion question,17 6 the standard of foreseeability depends on a com-
plex mixture of what the content provider knows or reasonably
should have known about the geographical consequences of its
acts, the significance of the extrajursidictional harms caused by
the acts, and the costs of precautions."' Content providers can al-
ready achieve pretty reliable information flow control by condi-
tioning access to content on telephone or facsimile proof of geo-
graphical location. To many this is an unacceptable burden on
Internet communication. But there is nothing sacrosanct about
Internet speed and ease, and dimunitions in speed and ease
might be warranted by the social costs imposed by uncontrolled
information flows. And in any event, as filtering and identifica-
tion technologies continue to raise the feasibility and lower the
costs of information flow control, the problem of notice in cyber-
space will look much like the problem of notice in real space.
V. GROUNDING CYBERSPACE IN REAL-SPACE LAW
I have argued that national and international regulations of
cyberspace transactions are legitimate and feasible. I have not
argued for any particular regulation, or that such regulation
should be pervasive. I have tried to show only that the skeptics'
global arguments against national and international regulation of
cyberspace are unfounded. Cyberspace self-regulation will often
... See text accompanying notes 78-85.
"'What is foreseeable will also be informed, in a circular fashion, by what the law re-
quires. If the law permits one jurisdiction to hold a content provider in another jurisdic-
tion strictly liable for the mere act of placing information on a web page, then this result is
foreseeable. The pertinent question is what level of foreseeability the law should require,
and this analysis is informed by the factors listed in the text.
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be difficult to achieve. And like non-cyberspace transactions, cy-
berspace transactions will in any event be limited by national
mandatory rules.
The challenging issue from a jurisdictional perspective is to
develop a legal structure that both facilitates private legal or-
dering of cyberspace transactions and accommodates national
mandatory law limitations. Consider the predicament of a person
in England who wants to buy a security from a web page on a
server in Japan. The parties want the sale to circumvent U.S. se-
curities regulations, and, more broadly, the interference of na-
tional courts. The parties thus agree that the sale will be gov-
erned by Japanese law and that any disputes will be resolved by
private arbitration in Japan. Will this contract be enforceable?
This example involves a commercial transaction. But the problem
is generic, for, as we saw above, parties can by contract create
governing legal structures for a variety of non-commercial activi-
ties. Thus, for example, the same basic problem arises when chat
room participants from different countries agree that the tort law
principles of the state of Illinois govern chat room activities, and
that all disputes will be resolved privately. Will the parties' ex
ante consent be respected when a chat room participant from
France claims in his national court that he suffered a tort in the
chat room in violation of French law?
To avoid national court litigation and minimize national
regulation, the parties to these transactions need to satisfy the
following conditions. They must consent ex ante to a governing
law, a private method of dispute resolution, and a private en-
forcement regime. The consent must be consistent with the man-
datory law applied by any national court where a defector from
the contract might seek to have any part of the contract declared
invalid.78 To ensure the sanctity of the private order and to dis-
'"There are of course some private legal orders that are relatively immune from this
requirement, either because the costs of defecting from the private order are greater than
the costs of continued participation, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J Legal Stud 115 (1992);
Posner, 63 U Chi L Rev at 165-97 (cited in note 69), or, relatedly, because the members of
the order structure their affairs to circumvent mandatory laws. See Frank H. Easterbrook
and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 3 (Harvard 1991) (corpo-
rate context). Even these prominent examples of mandatory law circumvention, however,
are not clear-cut. For example, Bernstein's paradigmatic examples of private legal orders
are sometimes subject to mandatory law interventions. See Bernstein, 21 J Legal Stud at
125 & n 24, 129 & n 35 (noting that arbitration awards can be vacated for procedural ir-
regularity and that the group's actions must conform with antitrust regulations). Simi-
larly, a corporation's ability to circumvent mandatory law restrictions is dependent in
large part on the settled but by no means inevitable choice-of-law rule that the law of the
place of incorporation governs internal corporate affairs. Mandatory corporate laws would
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courage such defection, the national court must be willing to (i)
treat the consent to the private order as valid, (ii) enjoin litigation
in derogation of the contract, and, sometimes, (iii) specifically en-
force the defector's agreement to abide by the private order.
Moreover, it is not enough that the courts of a single country will
enforce the contract. There must be coordinated enforcement
among national courts in every country in which the recalcitrant
party might go to seek to avoid the obligation. Finally, national
courts must subsequently recognize the validity of the private
dispute resolution process. They must enjoin subsequent litiga-
tion in derogation of the results of the private dispute resolution,
and enforce any judgments that cannot be done so privately.
Such a structure might appear hopelessly complicated and
thus fanciful. But this appearance is deceiving. The essentials for
such a regime already exist in the system that governs interna-
tional commercial arbitration.79 This system works through the
interplay of three layers of law. The first layer is the private law
of the parties' contract. In the contract, the parties specify the
law governing the transaction (in the examples above, the laws of
Japan and Illinois), agree to use private arbitration to resolve
certain disputes that arise out of or relate to the transaction, and
choose the place for the arbitration and the procedures that gov-
ern it.' The second layer is the national arbitration law.'' A na-
tional arbitration law defines the scope of permissible arbitration
within the country, renders arbitration agreements within this
scope valid, and provides various forms of judicial assistance for,
and judicial review of, arbitration. Most nations have generally
similar national arbitration laws that ensure harmonization of
enforcement across jurisdictions. This harmonization is substan-
tially bolstered by the third layer of legal regulation: the interna-
be harder to avoid if nations and states instead applied local corporate law on the basis of
the local effects of corporate transactions. See, for example, Western Airlines, Inc v Sobi-
eski, 191 Cal App 2d 399, 12 Cal Rptr 719, 727-29 (1961) (applying California cumulative
voting rule to Delaware corporation doing significant business in California). Because for a
variety of reasons it frequently will be difficult for cyberspace communities to completely
circumvent mandatory law restrictions, I will set aside this possibility in the analysis.
'Two excellent introductions to international commercial arbitration are Gary B.
Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States: Commentary and Mate-
rials (Kluwer 1994), and Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed 1991).
'"The most prominent international arbitration rules are those promulgated by the
International Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association, the London
Court of International Arbitration, and the UNCITRAL. These rules are generally similar
but contain important differences. See Born, International Commercial Arbitration at 10-
16, 50-96 (cited in note 179).
,.. In the United States, this law is the Federal Arbitration Act, Pub L No 282, 61 Stat
669 (1947), codified at 9 USC §§ l et seq (1994).
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tional enforcement treaty. By far the most important such treaty
is the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards, which almost every nation has signed.182 The
Convention obligates the national courts of signatory states to
recognize and enforce arbitration agreements and awards, subject
to limited exceptions."
The basic structure of international commercial arbitration
could easily be modified to cyberspace. As explained above, the
law of the contract-both the substantive law and the dispute
resolution mechanism-could be agreed to as an incident of the
securities transaction or as a condition of access to the chat
room.' National arbitration laws could be modified to include
dispute resolution in cyberspace. For example, the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA7) would require modification in only two impor-
tant respects. First, the FAA's requirement that the arbitration
agreement be made in writing might need to be amended to ac-
commodate cyberspace realities.' Second, FAA rules that turn
on the place of the arbitration.. require modification for virtual
arbitrations that lack a geographical locus.'87 The New York Con-
vention would likely require similar amendment.
" The Convention is reproduced at 9 USC § 201 (1994). For general commentary, see
Born, International Commercial Arbitration at 18-20 (cited in note 179); A. Jan van den
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Inter-
pretation (Kluwer 1981).
" The exceptions, which are narrowly construed, can be grouped in four categories.
First, the Convention has certain jurisdiction prerequisites. For example, it does not apply
to oral arbitration agreements, to domestic arbitrations, or to noncommercial arbitrations.
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
Arts I, II, June 10, 1958, 330 UNTS 38. Second, the obligation to enforce arbitration
agreements and awards does not extend to matters that, under national law, are nonarbi-
trable or violate a strong public policy. Id at Arts II(1), V(2). I discuss this exception fur-
ther below. See note 188. Third, the duty to enforce arbitral awards does not extend to
awards rendered without minimal due process protections (such as notice). Id at Art
V(1)(b). And fourth, the duty to enforce arbitral awards does not extend to ultra vires
awards. Id at Art V(1Xc).
'"See Section III.A.
"MIt is possible, however, that an agreement in cyberspace constitutes an agreement in
writing. For an overview of various responses to this problem, see Michael E. Schneider
and Christopher Kuner, Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce, 14 J
Intl Arb 5, 13-15 (1997); Jasna Arsfc, International Commercial Arbitration on the Inter-
net: Has the Future Come Too Early?, 14 J Intl Arb 209, 215-17 (1997).
'"See, for example, 9 USC § 4 (1994) (authorizing federal court to order arbitration
"within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed");
9 USC § 10(b) (1994) (providing for limited judicial review by '[t]he United States district
court for the district wherein an award was made").
" Under the current international arbitration legal regime, national arbitration laws
govern many issues of judicial assistance other than enforcement of the agreement and
award. These issues include, for example, certain aspects of discovery, the selection of ar-
bitrators when the parties have not done so, and provisional relief. National court jurisdic-
tion over these issues is almost always determined by the fact that the arbitration takes
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The accommodation of mandatory laws presents special
challenges. In the securities example, assume that the English
purchaser is unhappy with the security, and defects from the con-
tractual agreement to arbitrate by bringing a private securities
action in a U.S. court that alleges that the sale was fraudulent
and in violation of U.S. securities law. This raises two basic man-
datory law issues. The first is whether the U.S. court will enforce
the agreement to arbitrate, or will instead adjudicate the manda-
tory law (and perhaps other) claims. Assuming the court enforces
the arbitration agreement, the second question is whether the ar-
bitrator can apply the U.S. mandatory law consistent with the ju-
risdictional limits imposed by the parties' contractual choice of
Japanese law.
Both difficulties frequently arise with respect to non-
cyberspace transnational transactions, and can be addressed
within the framework of international commercial arbitration. As
for the first problem, national courts increasingly permit private
arbitrators to resolve claims involving economic regulation and
quasi-criminal laws subject to subsequent, deferential judicial re-
view.s s The deferential nature of such review, combined with the
costs of seeking it, mean that private arbitrators will often have
the final say. As for the second problem, arbitrators have estab-
lished a number of devices grounded in (often fictional) party con-
place within the jurisdiction. Because the locus of an arbitration in cyberspace is difficult
to identify, many jurisdictions might assert the power of judicial review and assistance.
One answer to this problem is coordination of the judicial assistance function. Such en-
forceable coordination could be accomplished most effectively by international treaty. In-
deed, the New York Convention's judicial enforcement provisions could be modified to
cover judicial assistance. Another (less effective) possibility is to make national arbitration
laws uniform, so that it doesn't matter which court provides judicial assistance. This is the
basic strategy of the UNCITRAL model arbitration law. See generally Born, International
Commercial Arbitration at 37-38 (cited in note 179). For an overview of other solutions to
these difficulties, see Arsic, 14 J Intl Arb at 217-20 (cited in note 185).
"The Supreme Court, for example, has ruled that antitrust, RICO, and securities
claims are arbitrable. Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220, 242
(1987) (holding RICO claims to be arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 632-40 (1985) (holding Sherman Act claims to be arbitrable);
Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506, 518-20 (1974) (holding claims under the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934 to be arbitrable). See generally Born, International Com-
mercial Arbitration at 322-66 (cited in note 179). These decisions are not required by the
New York Convention. To the contrary, The New York Convention and national arbitra-
tion laws permit an exception to national courts' obligation to enforce arbitration agree-
ments and awards when the arbitration involves a nonarbitrable subject. See New York
Convention, Arts II(1), V(2) (cited in note 183). But this exception has been construed in
an increasingly narrow fashion, as nations increasingly delegate the task of enforcing
mandatory laws to private arbitrators.
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sent that permit them to apply a mandatory law of a country
other than the one specifically chosen by the parties' contract.1 89
To many it will seem ironic and damning that my description
of a legal regime that supposedly promotes private ordering fo-
cuses so much on the role of national courts and national laws.
This focus is misleading. Much of the regulation of these private
matters is and will continue to be governed by a variety of pri-
vately enforceable rules, norms, and enforcement mechanisms.
Yet the overarching national and international legal regimes re-
main necessary for two reasons. First, they provide a ready-made
coordination and enforcement regime that transnational parties
can invoke in the many situations in which information-gathering
and related costs of purely private enforcement are prohibitively
high. Second, they give private parties enormous flexibility in
creating a private regime in a fashion that can accommodate and
minimize the intrusion of oft-conflicting mandatory laws. In this
connection, it should be emphasized that the international com-
mercial arbitration model is not as litigious, and would not be as
intrusive on private cyberspace orders, as it might at first glance
appear. If real-space commercial arbitrations are any guide, re-
course to national courts will be relatively infrequent as the
background public enforcement patterns become relatively clear.
I do not mean to suggest that international commercial arbi-
tration is a comprehensive panacea for the jurisdictional chal-
lenges of cyberspace. It is not. Many, probably most, cyberspace
transactions will have such a low value that affected parties will
not bother to enter into contractual relations, much less contract
for governing law and private enforcement. In addition, cyber-
space transactions that adversely affect third parties are beyond
the ken of international commercial arbitration, which depends
upon ex ante consent for its effectiveness and legitimacy. Related-
ly, although the international arbitration regime has taken steps
to privatize the enforcement of mandatory laws, many mandatory
laws-most prominently traditional criminal laws and certain
limits on contractual capacity-are not subject to enforceable in-
ternational arbitration. Indeed, some might object that cyber-
space-related choice-of-law and private arbitration agreements
that are not dickered should be viewed as unenforceable contracts
of adhesion.90
'" See Born, International Commercial Arbitration at 147-52 (cited in note 179).
'"I have tried to avoid analysis of the merits of particular regulatory regimes in this
article, but it is perhaps worth noting that this adhesion contracts concern has relatively
little force in the cyberspace context, where users have an array of options for the large
majority of functions and services.
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These limitations on the international commercial law re-
gime are not, of course, unique to cyberspace transactions. These
same limitations characterize real-space transnational transac-
tions. Such limitations are inevitable when it is difficult for par-
ties to transnational transactions to craft private legal regimes ex
ante, or when these transactions harm third parties or implicate
the paternalistic interests of affected nations. The important
point is that these limitations are difficult to overcome in "real
space" and cyberspace alike. My modest aim has been to show
that the governing law challenges presented by cyberspace are
not significantly different from the ones presented by other
transnational transactions.
CONCLUSION
Cyberspace transactions are no different from "real-space"
transnational transactions. They involve people in real space in
one jurisdiction communicating with people in real space in other
jurisdictions in a way that often does good but sometimes causes
harm. There is no general normative argument that supports the
immunization of cyberspace activities from territorial regulation.
And there is every reason to believe that nations can exercise ter-
ritorial authority to achieve significant regulatory control over
cyberspace transactions. Resolution of the choice-of-law problems
presented by cyberspace transactions will be challenging, but no
more challenging than similar problems raised in other transna-
tional contexts.
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